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ABSTRACT 
 
MAYER, RACHEL   The Politics of Sex: Analyzing the Relationship between 
the State and Gender, Identity and Desire, June 2012 
 
ADVISOR: MARSO, LORI 
 
 The disenfranchised experiences of women are central to feminist understandings 
of identity. Crucial to this understanding is the question of what is the cause of female 
oppression and how to remedy the situation. This introduces the concept of state power 
and its relationship to women. The state, as the seat of legal and political power, has the 
ability to serve as both protector and oppressor.  
 The thesis is devoted to exploring feminist perspectives and critiques on state 
power such as arguments for state intervention in the protection of women through 
concrete action such as gender-specific laws. Opposing this view is the perspective that 
political solutions can both overthrow AND codify existing social conditions. Ultimately, 
the state represents a problem of power because it has the capacity to act as both the 
protector and oppressor of women. These perspectives frame the thesis, which addresses 
a wide range of topics, including: 
Sexuality and desire as it relates to social equality, sexual violence and the role of the 
state in responding to it, equality in relation to male political power, and the concept 
of feminist jurisprudence. 
These topics form an analysis of contemporary feminist debate and the 
experiences of women. As a collective, the chapters contextualize modern understandings 
of female perspectives and attempt to strike a balance between primary discourses 
surrounding topics of contention. The thesis as a whole aims to further feminist 
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discussion and understanding on the diversity of female perspectives and how to respond 
to these understandings of the female condition. 
 
 
 
 
4 
Preface 
 
 
 The disenfranchised experiences of women are central to feminist understandings 
of female identity. Crucial to this understanding is the question of what causes this 
oppression and how to determine a means to remedy the situation. The process of finding 
a lasting solution introduces the concept of state power and its relationship to women. 
The state, as the seat of legal and political power, has the ability to serve as both protector 
and oppressor. This role of power begs the question of the extent to which the state is 
responsible for female oppression and if state solutions to this oppression can be found. 
 Contemporary feminist debate tends to view the state in one of the 
aforementioned two ways. Therefore, the role of the state in forming a gender equitable 
society remains an unresolved issue, one this thesis aims to address. Viewing the state as 
either protector or oppressor opens a set of theoretical and practical problems regarding 
the lives of women. Therefore, the speculative question is whether or not feminist politics 
and the lived experiences of women benefit from a palpable state presence in responding 
to calls for gender equality. Furthermore, how is this relationship between the state and 
gender equality conceptualized? The nebulous relationship between state power and the 
formation of a gender equitable society has left feminist thinkers with a number of 
theoretical questions regarding how to confront the social ills suffered by women. What 
is at stake is not merely a theoretical problem. How the role of the state is theoretically 
conceived has a very real impact on the lives of individuals. This is not politics only in 
theory, but as it relates to the lived experience of women. For example, feminist thinker 
Ruth Milkman poses the question, “Are women’s interests best served by public policies 
that treat women and men identically, ignoring the social and cultural differences 
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between them? Or should we view those differences positively and seek greater 
recognition and status for traditionally female values and forms of behavior?” (Milkman 
375). The question she asks is an important one. In what manner can state power be 
effectively used to meet female needs? Complicating the issue is the dichotomy 
associated with vocalizing rights and the power of the state. Whether we view the state as 
an oppressor or protector determines whether or not women turn to the state for redress 
from sexual violence, or if single mothers seek state-sponsored welfare. The implications 
of addressing the questions of this thesis is not limited to theoretical inquiry, but explores 
the experiences of women whose lives are directly impacted by state power. 
 This task has been aided by a genealogy of political thinkers who have 
reconsidered state power and the formation of individual identity and sexuality. Guiding 
the construction of the paper is noted feminist, Catherine MacKinnon, who argues 
heavily for state intervention in the protection of women through concrete action such as 
gender-specific laws, which, according to her, offer a greater level of protection. 
According to MacKinnon, the state should take responsibility for its role in shaping the 
sexuality and condition of women in society. The existence of pornography, for example, 
ensures that women are seen as subordinate to men. In her argument, state power should 
be used instead to emancipate women from their condition of social oppression through 
legal codification. 
Running alongside this argument is the perspective of Wendy Brown, who differs 
in her perspective on how to respond to female oppression. While she does not verbalize 
solutions as succinctly as MacKinnon, she unveils crucial considerations, such as the 
diverse, multi-faceted reality of female perspectives – not all of which conform to 
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MacKinnon’s views. She points out that political solutions can both overthrow AND 
codify existing social conditions. As she articulates, “the more highly specified rights are 
as rights for women, the more likely they are to build that fence insofar as they are more 
likely to encode a definition of women premised on our subordination in the 
transhistorical discourse of liberal jurisprudence” (Brown 2002: 422). In other words, 
explicitly articulating rights in legal code runs the risk of entrenching social conceptions 
of female vulnerability in political terms. Ultimately, the state represents a problem of 
power because it has the capacity to formalize social conceptions of female vulnerability, 
in addition to its dual identity of protector and oppressor. While the language of law 
allows for the protection of women, it also holds the power to confine them to traditional 
conceptions of gender. As such, women cannot necessarily expect liberation from an 
oppressive state. Furthermore, she takes into consideration the existence of multiple 
perspectives and acknowledges that what is seen as oppressive from one perspective may 
be seen as liberating by another. For instance, in regards to the aforementioned example 
of pornography, one perspective may argue that pornography represents sexual 
oppression while another perspective may argue that it is sexually liberating. Therefore, 
Wendy Brown’s perspective demonstrates that contemporary feminist concerns are not as 
straightforward as MacKinnon’s analysis might suggest. 
 These two main perspectives frame the thesis, which addresses a wide range of 
inter-related topics, organized based on the scope of the debate. Ideas introduced first 
will be those based on social normative values, then transitioning to the role of state 
power and then understandings of equality and justice as it relates to both social and 
political understandings of the female condition. 
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While much of this thesis is devoted to exploring the diversity of feminist 
perspectives and feminist critiques on state power, questioning the role of the state as it 
relates to gender equality is not only a feminist inquiry. It has also been conceptualized 
by queer theorists, such as Michael Warner and psychoanalysts, such as Jessica 
Benjamin. Therefore, this formative question is critical because it not only addresses the 
status of women, but also society as a whole and how an individual’s identity is socially 
formed. Therefore, queer theorists exploring sexuality and psychoanalysts considering 
the formation of identity also have a stake in how state power is constructed and 
reconstituted in social contexts. 
 Therefore this thesis has also required a reconsideration of the manner in which 
political power is distributed and how it is expressed in different contexts. As a result, the 
chapters of this thesis are organized around the different manners in which state power 
informs both political and social experiences of individuals. 
 
Chapter one, titled, “The Politics of Sexuality and Desire,” focuses on individual 
expressions of desire as how it relates to social equality. This section addresses the 
dichotomy between private and public aspects of sexuality and how this shapes individual 
identity. Both feminist thinkers and queer theorists attempt to explain not only this 
dichotomy, but also how an individual’s identity is shaped by normative social values and 
then reflected through the state in the form of explicit dictation of what is acceptable and 
what is not. This explicit dictation is realized through the legal endorsement of social 
norms such as heterosexual marriage. This explicit endorsement of heterosexual norms 
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dismisses the possibility of an alternative mode of being and reinforces social 
expectations on the citizen through the pervasiveness of state power.  
The chapter addresses a variety of issues, the first being desire itself, how it is 
formed and how it sculpts individual identity. The central issue is what is “normal” and 
what the consequences are for individuals who fall outside this traditional conception of 
what normal is. The concept of desire as it relates to social norms informs social 
understanding of gender roles and identity. The chapter’s analysis confronts this concept 
and raises the question regarding how political approval of normative expressions of 
sexuality impacts female identity and gender roles in political and social spheres. 
 
Chapter two, “Sexual Violence,” confronts the role of the state in responding to 
instances of sexual violence and encoding legal protection for women. The nature of 
atrocities against women and to what extent women are constructed as being violable is 
central to the chapter’s inquiry. An important aspect to this is the role of the state in 
responding to demands for justice and codifying legal protection for women. This role is 
especially significant in the language of law and the manner in which the state articulates 
the rights of women. This question of language is particularly evident when determining 
whether gender neutral or gender specific laws best meet the needs of women. Feminist 
thinker Catherine MacKinnon heavily advocates for gender specificity to express the 
rights and the protection of women in clear and explicit terms. However, Wendy Brown 
counters this by stating that to be this explicit is to confine women by this definition. In 
other words, legally explicit expressions of female vulnerability hold the ability to 
entrench traditional notions of women as victims. Therefore, it is uncertain whether or 
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not the state should be involved in addressing and preventing sexual violence and how 
this would effectively be achieved.  
In addition to exploring the dichotomy between gender-neutral and gender-
specific laws, the chapter explores the role of the state and how viewing the state as the 
protector and final arbiter of justice forms a very specific relationship between state 
power and women. The nature of this relationship is central to understanding the nuances 
of legal and theoretical arguments for state involvement in women’s lives in order to 
address sexual violence. Therefore, when discussing how the power of the state can be 
used to address the vulnerability of women, context matters. Rights law and the language 
through which it is constructed define the context through which crimes of sexual 
violence are understood. This conceptualization is vital not only to prevent sexual 
violence against women, but also to address the option of political, social and legal 
recourse available to victims. 
 
The third chapter, “The Law of Equality – Feminist Jurisprudence” addresses the 
role of jurisprudence as a means to remedy social ills. An exploration of a feminist theory 
of state and political solutions to female oppression aims to explain the state’s capacity to 
resolve the problem of justice in a patriarchal society. This chapter also explores 
understandings of equality and to what extent difference is translated into dominance. 
The manner in which women’s status is defined in relation to men’s is explored, in 
addition to the nature of political power as how it relates to male and female identity. 
In essence, this chapter looks at the over-arching issue of the role of state power 
in upholding individual rights and promoting the establishment of a gender-equitable 
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society. Feminist theory conceptualizes state power as both a tool for justice and a tool 
for oppression. The goal of feminist jurisprudence is to confront the law and its approach 
to gender in order to rework legal approaches to gender rights and the manner in which 
concrete laws can advance the position of women. However, this is not only a theoretical 
question. This conceptualization of the state as to how it relates to sexuality and identity 
plays out in a number of very real ways, such as obscenity laws and laws regulating 
prostitution. Therefore, how the state regulates personal expression holds the possibility 
to encode and entrench social normative values. As a result, state power becomes 
problematic. While the state can be viewed as a protector, there is a limit to how state 
power can be used to emancipate the oppressed. The issue then becomes how to establish 
concrete protection while maintaining an understanding of vague universal ideals. This 
balance helps to construct an understanding of justice as to how it relates to social and 
political power and the manner in which state power holds the possibility to act as a 
mechanism of oppression. 
 
The final chapter, “Re-Imagining Gender,” aims to address the larger question 
formulated by previous chapters. While previous chapters present a number of paradoxes 
and theoretical conundrums, this chapter’s purpose is to suggest alternatives. Alternative 
conceptions of gender, sexuality and identity offer the possibility of a new understanding 
of gender relations. Current understandings of state power determine how gender equality 
is addressed and the available options to confront social and political vulnerability. 
Therefore, re-imagining state power, along with sexuality and individual identity, 
changes the conversation of how to encourage the development of an equitable society. 
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Re-imagining these traditional conceptions allows for the re-examining of social and 
political contexts and how gender fits into these contexts. One manner to address the 
dichotomies raised by previous chapters is to re-consider the manner in which we 
understand the relationship between gender and state power. Through this 
reconsideration, new possibilities can be imagined in order to establish the rights of 
women and to address the vulnerabilities that they experience.  
 
These topics, while diverse, collectively form a comprehensive analysis of 
contemporary feminist debate and how it relates to the lived experience of women, as 
well as theoretical conceptions of sexuality, identity, and gender. To accomplish this task, 
a consideration of multiple feminist perspectives is required in order to assess and 
respond to the female condition in relation to a patriarchal state. Ultimately this thesis 
lends itself to contemporary feminist discourse and aims to frame modern debate of 
significant feminist concerns. As a collective, these chapters both contextualize and 
frame modern understandings of female perspectives and attempt to strike a balance 
between the primary running discourses surrounding these topics of contention. The 
thesis as a whole aims to further feminist discussion and understanding on the diversity of 
female perspectives and how to respond to these understandings of the female condition. 
Furthermore, it confronts the numerous questions raised by opposing views within the 
feminist community regarding legal protection and the encoding of rights for women. As 
political philosopher Kenneth Baynes correctly surmises, “[Rights] are at least in part a 
function of the sociopolitical system in which a more or less determinate set of rights 
operates […] This profoundly complicates the status we can grant rights as the guarantor 
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of interests and subjects” (Baynes 457). As he expresses, rights are a function of both the 
political and social contexts in which they are formed. As such, the process of encoding 
gender rights in an effective manner is not as straightforward as simply legally expressing 
the interests of women. Instead, this process is a product of the complicated relationship 
between the state and the sociopolitical formation of gender, identity and desire. This 
thesis aims to bridge the gap posed by Kenneth Bayne’s assertion through assessing the 
dichotomy presented by the problem of state power as how it relates to the status of 
women. 
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Chapter One – The Politics of Sexuality and Desire 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
The sexuality of the individual, how it is shaped and how it is expressed is 
integral to the development of the self. There are two primary aspects to human sexuality, 
the private and personal and the public, where sexuality is ultimately dictated by societal 
norms and pressures. Several feminist and queer theorists attempt to explain and 
understand this dichotomy and how an individual’s identity is shaped by normative social 
values and then reflected in turn through the state in the form of a dictation of what is 
acceptable and what is not. Therefore, what is “natural” or “authentic” about sexuality 
remains in question. 
 This chapter will explore different interpretations of sexuality and the manner in 
which it defines the lives of women both privately and publicly. While sexuality and 
expressions of sexuality are generally understood as social constructs, the state regulates 
any expression of sexuality that deviates from the norm. The state regulates sexual 
behavior in a number of ways, such as marriage laws or the legal recognition of same-sex 
couples. Through the ability of state power to legitimize or de-legitimize the expression 
of individual sexuality, individual identity becomes inherently political. Furthermore, the 
political enforcement of a singular accepted expression of sexuality entrenches traditional 
gender roles and norms. In this chapter, I turn to feminist and queer theorists who explore 
what effects state and social regulation of sexuality has on an individual’s identity. 
Theories such as those proposed by Judith Butler, Michael Warner, and Jessica Benjamin 
will be explored. Judith Butler explores the relationship between kinship, the state, and 
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desire through a theoretical exploration of Sophocles’ play Antigone. The relationship 
between Antigone and her uncle, King Creon narrate the relationship between state 
power and an individual’s identity. King Creon represents the oppressive nature of the 
state, which is met by the defiance of Antigone. The play – and Butler’s analysis – 
explore the relationship between the state and its role in recognizing another on both an 
individual level and as a citizen. Michael Warner explores the role of the state in desire, 
sexuality and shame, particularly as it pertains to the LGBT community to explore how 
social values become politically enforced to suppress individual expression of sexuality. 
Meanwhile, Jessica Benjamin explores how desire is formed and the manner in which it 
sculpts human identity, societal bonds and interactions, and sexual domination. The 
dynamic between these three theorists paint a picture of how state power can define 
individual identity and how individual identity fits within a social and political context. In 
this manner, individual identity becomes defined by the traditional sexual and gender 
roles that state power imposes on individuals. 
 The chapter will explore the nuances of these ideas to address the issue of human 
sexuality as it relates to societal norms which become reflected through the state through 
the tacit endorsement of approved heteronormative expression and the simultaneous 
disavowal of an alternative mode of being. This endorsement can be manifest in a variety 
of ways, such as the legal entrenchment of norms, and the rights of homosexuals and 
ultimately enforces societal expectation on the citizen through state power.  
 The relationship between politics, sexuality, and desire manifests itself in several 
different contexts, both social and political. The first aspect of this relationship stems 
from desire itself, how it is formed and how it sculpts human identity and the manner in 
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which societal norms shape female sexuality. Michael Warner informs this analysis 
through his exploration of what it means to be “normal” and the affect it has on the 
individual who does not conform to this standard. This idea of desire and societal 
expectations informs societal understanding of gender roles and the dichotomy of public 
and private life, political freedom and the social definition of identity. The subsequent 
issue that this social definition raises is the tension between the social and personal 
definition of identity, resulting in the concept of taboo in a society that disallows sexual 
variance. These interlocking ideas ultimately formulate a relationship between sexuality 
and state power, where the social sphere is reflected through the state. Female sexuality 
becomes regulated through state statutes of pornography and prostitution while 
heteronormative values as they are enforced by the state impose state power upon all 
citizens. 
 This analysis raises the question of how the political endorsement of a socially 
accepted form of sexuality impacts female identity and the manner in which male and 
female power is dealt with in the political sphere. Furthermore, an understanding of the 
manner in which socially accepted forms of sexuality dictate political life allows us to 
imagine an alternative way of framing desire. An alternative understanding of desire 
would in turn restructure social comprehension of acceptable sexual variance and the 
manner in which state power enforces its will on individual identity. 
 
 
II. Desire 
 
 
 Desire is in many ways the motivation for human action. An individual’s desire 
and sexuality is closely linked to the way they identity themselves and display this 
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identity to others. Therefore, the recognition of an individual’s sexuality desire is closely 
tied to the recognition of an individual’s identity. To deny an individual the 
acknowledgement of their desire as legitimate is to undermine their identity. The 
legitimacy of an individual’s desire is sculpted by social norms, in addition to state 
recognition of the display of this identity as legitimate. An exploration in the 
development of desire lends itself to an analysis by Jessica Benjamin, who interprets the 
progression of desire as beginning in infancy. Benjamin’s assertions are that desire stems 
from an affirmation of self: individuals seek an affirmation of their own identity and 
search for mutual recognition in other individuals. This relates to the overarching idea 
that one’s identity is closely based on the recognition of the self. Benjamin begins her 
analysis with the earliest form of this recognition through the mother-child bond of joint 
identity. However, as the child becomes older, they either identify or disidentify with the 
mother. For example, she argues that female children can identify with the mother based 
on sexual similarity, while male children are unable to do so. As a result, male children 
disidentify with the mother, and all other females, shaping an early example of male-
female disassociation. This, she claims, is the origin of complementary, yet unequal, 
sexual roles. Ultimately, the gender difference that is realized between male children and 
their mothers result in gender dominance because of the individual search for self-
recognition, in addition to the reinforcing of gender roles through traditional divisions of 
labor within the family itself. According to her analysis, desire lends itself to either 
mutual recognition or self-assertion. Mutual recognition – which the male child seeks 
from his mother – is the process by which the self is able to realize agency and authorship 
in a tangible way through a confirmation of our own identity as being similar to another’s 
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(Benjamin 12). When male children are unable to receive the mutual recognition they 
seek from the mother because of their inherent sexual differences, they in turn assert their 
own separate identity. This later results in male domination due to the fact that when 
“opposites can no longer be integrated; one side is devalued, the other is idealized” 
(Benjamin 50). The inability to maintain the balance between mutual recognition and 
self-assertion results in this splitting where male and female become two unequal sides of 
an interlocking whole. 
 The implications of this are vast. Not only do Benjamin’s assertions develop into 
a larger theory on adult sexuality and domination, but it also defines sexuality in terms of 
an immutable biological difference in gender, as well as historical social gender roles 
which confine women to the role of motherhood. This would suggest that the unequal 
roles of men and women are deeply socially ingrained and in some ways, psychologically 
inherent, disallowing an alternative interpretation of sexuality, desire and social gender 
roles. However, a nuanced interpretation of female desire potentially counteracts this. 
The sexual liberation of women has allowed for an interpretation of desire that does not 
immediately associate female sexuality with motherhood. This opens up social dialogue 
to imagine alternative forms of desire and sexual roles. If Benjamin’s assertions are true 
and human sexuality is rooted in disassociation with the mother figure, separating female 
sexuality from motherhood allows us to imagine alternative expressions of human 
sexuality and desire and in turn a greater variance in human identity and the social norms 
which influence it. She explores this idea through The Story of O., which can be read as 
an allegory for recognition through a total renunciation of the self, illustrated through a 
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tale of female submission. It is not only a tale of female submission, however, but also an 
exploration in how sexual expression and dominance is rooted in a desire for recognition.  
In Benjamin’s analysis, because the dominant force grants recognition to the 
subjugated, both the dominant and submissive forces are given meaning through a 
process of mutual recognition: “ A condition of our own independent existence is 
recognizing the other” (Benjamin 53). The need for recognition as a term of an 
individual’s existence creates an interdependence where each relies on the other for their 
own recognition and existence. Because each is looking for recognition in the other, 
sexual relations are not necessarily uniquely about dominance, but the manner in which 
mutual recognition is achieved. If one side is completely dominated, it is no longer a 
separate entity that can grant the dominant force recognition, and vice versa.  However, 
she acknowledges a larger problem develops from the refusal on one individual to accept 
interdependence as a form of recognition. This refutation of interdependence manifests in 
dominance, which can be seen in a larger societal context through socially constructed 
gender roles and the manner in which they define our identity. 
 Similarly, Michael Warner addresses the issue of domination when he posits that 
morality begins with the controlling of others. He illustrates this through the examples of 
prohibition, regulation and norms. Therefore, in this sense, the state represents a 
dominating force with the ability to regulate behavior. Sexuality, and more specifically, 
sexual shame, is political. Warner argues that there are certain individuals, such as 
members of the LGBT community who stand at greater risk to be “beaten, murdered, 
jailed” for their sexual identity and forced to be “burdened by furtiveness […]. They will 
find it hard to distinguish the social shame from its politics, their personal failings from 
19 
the power of alien norms” (Warner 3). The relationship between social norms and their 
political nature make it difficult for individuals to distinguish the social shame imposed 
on them from the political delegitimization of their identity. This creates a separation 
between those who conform to politically and socially legitimate sexual norms and those 
who do not, decreasing sexual variance and entrenching a singular understanding of 
sexuality and desire.  
According to Warner, this sort of judgment based on one’s sexuality and sex life 
promotes the creation of a social hierarchy of sexuality and the politics of sex through the 
social understanding of an accepted expression of sexuality and the state enforcement of 
this expression. This culminates in a unique form of oppression and is demonstrated 
through the state’s delegitimization of sexual behaviors which deviate from the socially 
accepted norm. As expressed earlier, one’s sexuality is a crucial aspect of identity. To 
enforce a given norm as the only legitimate form of desire devalues alternative forms of 
desire, sexuality and individual identity. In essence, society and the state are able to deny 
one’s identity through the entrenchment of a singular accepted form of desire. Warner 
coins this oppression as a “politics of identity”. He states: “sexual orientation is 
fundamental to one’s personality and is not mere sexual behavior” (Warner 29). In effect, 
there is a difference between identity and sexual practices, despite the tendency to define 
an individual through their sexual behavior. State power has the ability to impose an 
accepted form of sexual identity by regulating the display of behaviors that deviate from 
accepted normative behaviors. In this manner, state power gives legitimacy to a singular, 
socially accepted identity while others are delegitimized. Warner explores this concept 
through the example of the Supreme Court case Bowers v. Hardwick, which addressed 
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the Georgia sodomy law that became viewed uniquely as a “homosexual sodomy” 
statute, despite representing a form of sexual behavior which is able to be performed 
regardless of orientation (Warner 30). However, the act became associated with an 
identity. Georgia was capable of banning the act because of its connection to an identity 
that did not fit the accepted norm. This is similar to the military “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
provision, which made both behavior and identity equally punishable. Both these 
example illustrate the manner in which an accepted form of expressing sexuality and 
desire is imposed upon the general public.  
In essence, these acts of denying recognition deprive individuals of the self-
affirmation Benjamin claims they seek. The relationship between individuals of mutual 
recognition and self-affirmation is paralleled by the relationship between the citizen and 
the state. Just as individuals can grant or deny recognition to others, the state can grant or 
deny recognition as well. However, this denial by the state does not only deny one’s 
identity as an individual, but as a citizen. However, Warner demonstrates that a limited 
sexual variance in society is ultimately reflected through state action. The state codifies 
legitimate modes of expression and thereby delegitimizes any identity that does not meet 
this edict. Warner argues that this in turn results in an individual’s goal to redeem their 
own identity, through acts such as repudiating sex in order to separate identity from 
sexual practices. This repudiation represents an inherent desire for conformity and 
normalcy that is ultimately impossible for those who do not fit the accepted norms. This 
desire to meet the enforced standards is unsurprising when one examines how political 
power is distributed. The desire for the state’s recognition is based in its ability to deny 
one’s identity. Desiring the state’s recognition is to desire the legitimization of one’s 
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identity. While this desire is not unwarranted, it also establishes the state as holding the 
power to grant or deny recognition to an individual much in the same way Benjamin 
explores how dominance develops from the recognition of a dominant force. Those who 
are part of the “normal” group play to a larger audience and have the tacit understanding 
and support of the state and society, whereas those who differ are stigmatized. A 
hierarchy of power emerges from this, based on the manner in which one displays their 
“normalcy” to the larger public audience.  
This deep desire to be “normal” and to represent the “mainstream” raises a 
question: what constitutes normal? It can be said that everyone deviates from an expected 
norm in some way, yet there is still an accepted mode of being. What constitutes this and 
what does it imply for the individual’s desire to conform to it? What is normal is defined 
by what should be (Warner 57). This idealized version of the self is what serves as a 
norm and because it is idealized, it invites our conformity to it. The desire to be normal is 
essentially the desire to legitimize oneself. However, this view – that normal is what is 
legitimate – only establishes shame and delegitimizes the identity of other who deviate 
further from the norm. In this manner, alternatives become unimaginable and what is 
“normal” becomes further entrenched into our political and social psyches. 
Society needs a new standard of dignity and self-identification. The accepted idea 
that there is a norm to which one must conform devalues the identity of individuals who 
do not meet this accepted identity. When an individual is unable to gain recognition from 
the state or society, there is no means for the assertion of individual identity that will be 
accepted and recognized by larger society or state power. When this affirmation is 
denied, the state and society embody an oppressive force. Jessica Benjamin examines 
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how this affects an individual’s sexuality and results in the oppression of women through 
the assertion of a male identity while Michael Warner examines how state involvement in 
sexual identity promotes a culture of shame. Both demonstrate how oppressor and 
oppressed represent opposite sides of an interlocking whole when the dichotomy of 
“normal” and “deviant” is allowed to perpetuate. Society as a whole needs to reimagine 
an alternative understanding of gender roles, sexuality, and desire in order to 
acknowledge alternative forms of identity. If one cannot imagine an alternative 
understanding, the result is the perpetuation of gender and sexual hierarchy that allows 
for the oppression of those who do not meet the defined normative values. 
 
III. Gender Roles 
 
 
 The sexual hierarchy discussed by Warner and the opposing gender explained by 
Benjamin both introduce the concept of a political understanding to gendered social roles. 
Warner introduces the idea that an accepted norm inherently creates a hierarchy in which 
those who do not meet the ideal are delegitimized. This can be understood in gendered 
terms if we accept Benjamin’s analysis that the conception of the individual is male. An 
individual being with autonomy and recognition is capable of exerting political power 
and gaining acceptance with a larger public audience. Benjamin’s description of male-
female relations as an interlocking whole imply that gender roles are fixed, as the 
implication is that they cannot both occupy the same role of self-assertion at the same 
time. Therefore, we are left with the social hierarchy presented by Warner in which a 
given norm is idealized while all deviations from that norm is met with shame and a 
devaluation of individual identity. This social definition of identity and political power 
23 
have serious implications for state-approved relationships, represented through marriage, 
the public versus private life and the sphere of the home, in addition to how these aspects 
relate to political freedom.  
 While Benjamin proposes that men and women represent two corresponding 
halves to the understanding of sexual identity, this is not truly where sexual domination 
arises. According to her argument, domination is more closely related to the balance 
between the assertion of the self and the mutual recognition that allows the self and other 
to be equals (Benjamin 12). Domination itself occurs when this balance cannot be 
maintained and the opposites are unable to be integrated with one another. As a result, 
they are no longer different, but corresponding halves, but one side attempting to 
dominate the other. Once this balance is broken, one side becomes idealized while the 
other is devalued. Gender difference translates into gender dominance. Masculinity 
comes to represent authority while femininity is devalued. This subject-object 
relationship represents a sort of gender polarity that establishes male domination as 
inherent and promoted the repudiation of femininity (Benjamin 184).  
Yet the material world is not fixed in binary and this aspect our understanding 
does not necessarily mean that gender roles are understood through a fixed duality. 
Warner explores gender roles as a spectrum with individuals naturally deviating in some 
way from the norm. If we expand upon this idea of a spectrum, Warner’s conception of 
hierarchy develops. Individuals strive to conform to the standard norm because it is what 
is seen as legitimate. Being normal is a means to establish that legitimacy, but only 
through the delegitimization of others. A “hierarchy of shame” develops that is a product 
of the structure’s political nature. Warner uses this hierarchy to discuss gay and lesbian 
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politics. Normative political and social conceptions of gender and sexuality delegitimize 
the identity of individuals in the LGBT community and closely associate the gay rights 
movement with the shame of sex (Warner 49). He describes the movement’s politics as 
being defined by a permanent condition of embarrassment. However, the individuals who 
comprised the movement became involved primarily because of their investment in a 
world without stigma associated to their sexual identity. In its efforts to gain the 
acceptance from a public that viewed the movement as one of sexual deviancy, the 
movement disassociated itself from sex, attempting to delineate between sex behaviors 
and identity. The tension between one’s values and the pressure to relinquish these values 
to gain acceptance only further underlines the separation between legitimate and 
illegitimate. Ultimately, normative values represent a larger societal problem of being 
unable to imagine alternative understandings. Society has thus far been unable to 
conceive a world where men and women are integrated and variance in sexual identity is 
socially acceptable. 
 These normative values are often accompanied with either acceptance or 
repudiation by the state. The state has the power to legally codify and formally entrench 
social values. This power manifests in a variety of ways and contributes to the formal 
establishment of gender norms, sexual roles and approved sexuality. For example, Lori 
Marso asserts that marriage is a force that allows for the reproduction of gender norms. 
An exploration of the “bourgeois respectability” marriage grants its participants frames 
marriage as a significant aspect to social identity. Marriage can be understood as 
representing the state’s approval of heteronormative standards and forces gender norms 
on individuals. It is seen as integral to the female identity of wife and mother regardless 
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of individual identity. In this manner, marriage entrenches sexual norms of behavior. 
However, the institution of marriage is only able to do so because of its legitimizing 
aspect. Marriage provides a dimension of legitimacy on sexual relations that celebrates a 
circumscribed understanding of intimate relationships. However, this legitimizing aspect 
is very alluring for individuals Michael Warner would describe as “outcasts,” such as 
homosexuals, who suffer from social scorn that labels their relationships as illegitimate 
and shameful. What does the legitimizing power of marriage mean for gay couples that 
do not conform to the heteronormative values on gender? A problem arises when we 
view marriage as a right. As Marso illustrates, understanding marriage as a civil right can 
ultimately reinforce normative standards. While marriage as a state right presents 
individuals with the rights and protection of the state, it also eclipses our ability to 
imagine an alternative conception of social relationships. 
 Judith Butler explores the concept of an individual living outside traditional 
norms in her analysis of the play Antigone. Antigone serves as a lens to analyze state 
power because it explores the relationship between characters as a means to analyze state 
power. The story of Antigone follows a young woman who defies the edict of uncle, 
King Creon and buries the dead body of her brother. Creon is the state and through his 
role of representing state power, has the ability to legitimize or delegitimize others 
through granting or denying them recognition. This denial sculpts their identity as an 
individual and a citizen. Parallels can be drawn from this representation to theorize the 
relationship between state power and the citizen. Therefore, an analysis of Butler’s 
exploration of the dynamic between Antigone and her uncle – who is also the state – has 
important implications for the understanding of gender roles in relation to state power. 
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Like Benjamin, Butler discusses the concept of recognition and identity: “dying, indeed, 
from the premature circumscription of norms by which recognition as human can be 
conferred, a recognition without which the human cannot come into being but must 
remain on the far side of being” (Butler 81). Ultimately, human beings are robbed of 
identity through the assignment of roles by larger society.  Not only are robbed of an 
identity: they are deprived of one. They are given no recognition, so they cannot be. 
According to Hegel’s analysis of Antigone, she has no political identity and no place 
within citizenship because she is not capable of offering or receiving recognition (Butler 
13). This lack of recognition is created by virtue of her birth. She is both female and the 
product of an incestuous relationship, meaning she is invalidated in both the private and 
public sphere. She exists beyond these two spheres and challenges to traditional order. 
Antigone can be interpreted as an example of feminist political power, though she also 
represents the larger issue of the oppression of an individual by the community, despite 
her defiance of it. Butler explores this issue through Antigone by demonstrating that 
Creon is able to deny Antigone formal recognition and suppress her efforts at defiance 
through her punishment and eventual death sentence. Ultimately, the community 
maintains itself by suppressing individualism and promoting the normative values it 
enforces on the public. 
 Given the complexity of the relationship between normative gender roles and the 
ability of the state to endorse these roles, the idea of political freedom becomes a tenuous 
one. Can political freedom truly exist if, as Butler asserts, society sustains itself through 
the oppression of the individual? The political sphere acts as a mirror to the social one. If 
this is true, not only do our understandings of sexuality and social hierarchy need to be 
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re-imagined, but also our conception of state power and the manner in which it reflects 
social values. While Benjamin describes male-female relationships as opposite sides of a 
whole in which male dominance asserts itself, this relationship is not a fixed one. 
Benjamin’s psychological analysis implies that the gender dynamic is in some way 
inherent, yet she acknowledges that much of male-female relationships are socially 
constructed, as well as psychological. Therefore, Warner’s social conception of hierarchy 
is not fixed and can be restructured to incorporate sexual variance and multiple identities, 
as opposed to the singular normative identity that is held to be the ideal. Re-imagining the 
social and political order opens us to an alternative way of being. The gender roles 
imposed by society are not necessarily fixed and are ultimately subject to reinvention. 
However, a major obstacle to this process of re-imagining is the role of shame in 
exploring alternatives to the norm. Ultimately, social conceptions of normalcy have a 
dominant characteristic, which devalues alternatives through the imposition of a singular, 
accepted identity. 
 
IV. Sexual Shame 
 
 
 Deviations from the social norm inevitably have consequences for an individual’s 
notion of identity. As discussed earlier, a norm can be understood to be an idealized 
version of identity. Because it is purported as the accepted ideal, it demands conformity 
to it. Those who fail to conform are devalued and their identities are disparaged. As will 
be explored in this section, this results in a very specific form of shame. It is not only the 
shame of sex, but also the shame of sexual identity. Society has certain barriers in place, 
which it uses to enforce normative expressions of sexuality, through constructions of 
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taboo. These taboos, such as homosexuality or incest not only construct and accepted 
expression of sexuality and desire, but also negate all other expressions as illegitimate 
and even place shame and humiliation on their expression. The state in turn mirrors these 
values through formal means, such as state sanctioned relationships, through marriage 
and the establishment of LGBT rights. While, as Warner expressed, all individuals 
deviate in some way from the norm, the amount of shame increases with level of 
deviancy, known as the “hierarchy of shame”. This shame acts as a force of oppression, 
not only dictated what should not be, but what should be. 
 The idea of sexual deviance is in essence a problem of sexual difference. The 
struggle for recognition is ultimately a tale of coming to terms with difference (Benjamin 
181). Benjamin articulates the expression of sexuality and difference in terms of the guilt 
that is associated with desire when there is a lack of recognition. She explains this in 
terms of the “Oedipus riddle,” where she describes the sense of guilt one experiences at 
shameful unconscious desire as being inevitable (Benjamin 141). Warner echoes this 
statement in his claim that only immutable, genetic sexuality is seen as legitimate, 
necessitating conformity to the established heteronormative values. All other expressions 
of sexuality are subject to scrutiny and judgment, which comprises the politics of sex and 
the shame associated with sex. He asks if sex and dignity are incompatible.  
For homosexuals whose expression of sexuality counters the accepted norm, it is 
difficult to distinguish one’s identity from the shame of sexual behavior. He states: “The 
prevailing ideas of sexual identity being what they are […] stigma covers us all, at least 
in some contexts. As a consequence, people try to protect their identities by repudiating 
mere sex” (Warner 30). Not only is stigma difficult to separate from identity, it also 
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assigns an identity. Stigma assigns individuals to “a class, a recognizable kind of person,” 
regardless of an individual’s behavior (Warner 31). While individuals may attempt to 
separate stigma from sexuality, Warner illustrates that the two are deeply entwined. By 
attempting to challenge this shame based on one’s identity as being separate from sex 
causes the shame of sexual behavior to be reinforced. And because sexuality is viewed as 
being so closely linked to identity, one’s very identity is stigmatized. A problem with the 
official gay movement, as Warner asserts, is that it has attempted to separate the politics 
of identity from the politics of sex rather than directly confronting the sexual shame 
which assigns individuals an identity of stigma and shame (Warner 31). Therefore, it is 
not possible to reclaim identity by repudiating sex. Even if sexuality is not integral to 
identity, it is socially viewed to be integral to identity; meaning identity politics is 
inextricably linked with the politics of sexuality. The moralizing dialogue that individuals 
are subject to tells them that their sexuality must conform to the norm and that if it does 
not, that they fail to meet the idealized social identity. This selective legitimacy places a 
value on individual identity. There is one legitimate expression of sexuality and all other 
conceptions become suspect and taboo. 
 This concept of taboo is explored by Judith Butler in her analysis of Antigone, the 
daughter of Oedipus whose existence and her love for her brother eclipse traditional 
understandings of the bonds of kinship. Antigone is seen defiant not only in her actions 
against the edict of King Creon, but also her very existence and identity. As the product 
of an incestuous relationship, her very existence defines the socially accepted norms of 
kinship. As a result, her actions are understood within this context and her actions to bury 
her dead brother reinstate kinship as a form of scandal. Because Oedipus is both father 
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and brother – and in this sense, Oedipus and her brother Polyneices are interchangeable – 
her love for her brother is colored by her incestuous history. In essence, Antigone as a 
product of incest establishes “punishment [that] precedes crime” (Butler 77). It is further 
illustrated through her defiance of King Creon and her love for her brother. Her 
punishment is to live a life outside the bounds of accepted society. She is seen as in 
conflict with socially accepted forms of kinship and is labeled as deviant and marred by 
shame and humiliation. Her insolence towards King Creon and formal state edicts only 
serves to underline this defiance. She can therefore be understood as a subversive force, 
outside both the laws of kinship and the laws of the state.  
Butler explores the concept of incest as taboo because it is a variation of the norm 
and therefore inspires revulsion and disgust. She states that this revulsion is similar in 
many ways to the humiliation society places upon homosexuals, who, because of their 
own variation from the norm, have a similar identity of shame (Butler 71). This horror is 
in essence “a moralized sexual horror” that is directed towards all taboo relationships 
because they defy the accepted sexual norms. Warner echoes this sentiment in his 
analysis of shame that accompanies sex. He argues that sexual shame is inherently 
political through the manner in which this shame’s moralizing dialogue imposes its will 
on individuals. The publicity of sex establishes gay sex as abnormal and therefore 
offensive to the public. The shame and taboo of homosexual relationships establishes 
itself through the assertion that it is to protect community values and legitimate concern 
of obscenity. This moralizing dialogue is entrenched through the state. Public concern 
about obscenity manifests in obscenity laws and social disapproval of alternative forms of 
relationships develops into state-sanctioned relationships through marriage. This 
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distribution mechanism of rights and privileges ultimately establishes an accepted norm 
and defines all others as shameful and taboo and defines an individual’s relationship with 
state power. 
 This expression of public concern exacts a very specific type of oppression upon 
the individuals it scrutinizes. State power has the ability to dictate not only behavior, but 
also the expression of individual identity. This action of repression is exacted in the name 
of protecting the community or traditional, legitimate values. Michael Warner addresses 
this phenomenon in his analysis of the New York City gay scene and the process of 
“zoning out sex” within the community. The process became apparent in 1998 after Rudy 
Guiliani’s zoning law limiting adult establishments. Warner argues that the law has many 
gray areas; meaning even gay bookstores were targeted (Warner 150). Despite the gay 
community feeling persecuted, Warner describes the law as popular with the left and 
right and labeled “a victory” (Warner 151). This aspect of the public culture of sex leaves 
individuals vulnerable for public scrutiny. Their sexuality is no longer their personal 
identity, but a public, political one. This inherently changes the nature of sex and the 
relationship individuals have with their own sexuality. Their sexuality is no longer their 
own. It is public concern over obscenity. It is a social issue. It is a political issue. The 
state has the power to legitimize and validate relationships. It does so, and regularly, 
through marriage. Marriage allows the state to regulate relationships through deciding 
who is allowed to marry and who is not (Warner 92). It is problematic not only because 
of the symbolism marriage carries through its culture of legitimacy and privilege: it is in 
essence state validation. Furthermore, this legitimization becomes entrenched as the only 
way to bring validation to a relationship once deemed shameful. As Lori Marso 
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illustrates, viewing marriage as a civil right is one way to afford individuals the 
protections provided by state institutions, but its reinforcement as a means to gain 
legitimacy renders “all other choices suspect” (Marso 152). This state sanctioning of both 
validation and shame sculpts the individual’s relationship with the state. Those who are 
denied state validation are not afforded state rights and protection. Rather, they are 
subject to state oppression and denial of personal identity. 
 Sexual identity and desire is closely linked with individual identity. A problem 
arises when this identity becomes subject to state regulation. This form of regulation and 
sanctioning can cause deep distress for individuals who feel their personal identity and 
relationships are invalidated by state power. This establishes the state not only as an 
oppressive force, but also a mirror for the social sphere, reflecting social hierarchy, 
gender divisions and traditional values regarding sexuality and class. In this manner, the 
state regulates not only behavior, but also an individual’s intrinsic identity. The social 
conceptions of sexuality and desire need to be re-imagined, as does the relationship 
between individuals and the state to promote a standard of dignity that protects the 
identity of citizens from state persecution. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The formation of an individual’s identity is deeply informed by social and 
political context. Human sexuality, which has both private and public dimensions, is not 
only informed, but also governed by the social and political context in which it forms. 
Social norms that govern the formation of individual sexual identity then become 
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reflected through the state as legal regulation of sexual expression. Feminist and queer 
theorists explore this development as to how it is related to accepted forms of sexual 
expression. Furthermore, that which is seen as a deviation from the norm is interpreted as 
shameful. Norms, which are socially constructed as an idealized expression of identity, 
demand conformity to them by virtue of their standard of the ideal. Anything less than 
this ideal is seen as being deficient. Therefore, there are several aspects to the relationship 
between politics, sexuality, and desire. These aspects range from individual sexual 
identity to social and political regulation to the adherence to a standard of normalcy. In 
this manner, the state becomes a dominant force not only in public life, but private life as 
well. 
 The implications of a standard of normalcy are vast. Not only do these social and 
political standards govern individual identity and expression, but they also govern social 
and political interaction between individuals. State institutions such as marriage dictate 
which individuals can enter into state-sanctioned marriages and receive the benefits that 
are associated with it. Understanding how socially accepted forms of sexuality inform 
political regulation of private life frames desire in a markedly political context.  
This regulation sets the precedent for the establishment of the state as a tool of 
legal regulation of social issues. Therefore, it is unsurprising that many women turn to the 
state for the solution to issues like sexual violence. The following chapter explores the 
role of the state in preventing and protecting women from sexual violence, in addition to 
providing a legal framework for recourse. However, as will be explored, this establishes 
state power as a dominant force in the lives of women. This domination introduces a 
series of issues that raises a paradox of encoding rights for women in such a way that 
34 
they are defined by their vulnerability. Therefore, it is important to be cognizant of the 
social and political relationships that formulate individual sexual identity and how this 
identity is affected when the state becomes involved. 
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Chapter Two: Sexual Violence 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 While individual sexual behavior is deeply informed by social and political 
contexts, the question remains of the extent to which the state should be involved in the 
personal lives of individuals. In terms of the formation of individual sexuality, the 
presence of the state acts as a regulating force dictating the adherence to prescribed 
heteronormative standards of behavior. However, this establishes the state as a regulating 
force for sexual behavior, setting a precedent for state involvement for issues such as 
sexual violence. 
 Yet it is uncertain whether or not the state should be involved in preventing sexual 
violence against women and how this would effectively be achieved. When encoding 
legal protection, a high level of specificity runs the risk of legally entrenching the status 
of victimization assigned to women. At the same time, gender-neutral laws that promote 
women as equals are constructed in vague terms that potentially allow crimes of sexual 
violence against women to perpetuate. 
 This chapter explores the dichotomy of encoding legal protection against women 
and whether or not the state is able to effectively protect women from the sexual violence 
they experience. Furthermore, it examines the role of state power and how viewing the 
state as a protector frames the relationship between women and the state in a very 
specific way. Feminist theorists Catherine MacKinnon and Wendy Brown present the 
possibilities associated with formulating legal protection against sexual violence. While 
MacKinnon advocates for encoding strict legal protection, Brown raises the issue of 
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politically and legally entrenching the relative vulnerability of women and what this 
would imply for the social and political status of women. 
 Understanding the nuances of theoretical and legal arguments for state 
involvement in preventing sexual violence is central to addressing the issue of violence 
against women. In regards to rights law and encoding protection, context matters. The 
language of law and how it sculpts both political and social lives of women defines the 
context within which crimes of sexual violence understood. This understanding is vital to 
preventing sexual violence against women and addressing paths of social, political, and 
legal recourse.  
 
 
II. Theorizing Sexual Violence 
 
 
 It goes without saying that feminists agree that sexual violence is a terrible reality 
women face. However, questions remain over what constitutes this violence, what this 
violence means for the status of women, and who is responsible for preventing it. 
Resolving the questions regarding theoretical understandings of sexual violence has 
ramifications for women beyond theory and ultimately affects their lived experience. The 
understanding that develops from how sexual violence is assessed ultimately determines 
the manner in which this problem is remedied. Framing sexual violence and potentially 
viewing women as victimized by this violence defines the manner in which they can 
interact with political power to remedy their situation. Viewing women as being in a 
position of relative weakness or as lacking personal autonomy alters our perception of 
their ability to ameliorate their situation. Personal autonomy, or the ability to make 
decisions, defines what power is. When women are viewed as lacking this autonomy they 
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are acting from a position of relative powerlessness. Furthermore, because sexual 
violence is generally understood to be a crime committed on women by men, this power 
dynamic becomes a gendered one. As a result, this gendered power dynamic becomes 
understood as a relationship between relative female powerlessness and male power 
dominance. Dominant male power has the ability to eclipse the female perspective and 
establishes male political power. This dominant political power has the ability to remedy 
the reality of sexual violence or to perpetuate the subjugation of women and the manner 
in which this reality is approached is informed by social understandings of sexual 
violence. Therefore, as a society, our inherent understanding of sexual violence and what 
it means for women, men, and society as a whole, determines how we perceive the 
relative victimization of women relative to male state power.  
Susan Brownmiller asserts that “[Rape] is nothing more or less than a conscious 
process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear” (Brownmiller 
15). This line of thinking extends rape beyond the physical act of violation, to the 
assumption that rape defines political and societal relationships between men and women. 
It is this understanding that assigns men and women their social roles as victims and 
perpetrators, respectively. In Brownmiller’s line of thinking, the universal male has the 
power to consciously use rape and sexual violence as a tool for oppression by which he 
subjugates women. However, even if we accept this line of reasoning, we might still ask 
who is responsible for preventing it, or if its “universality” undermines the possibility for 
change.  
By contrast, Katie Roiphe questions whether or not rape and sexual violence are 
representative of female oppression. She argues that women are do not require protection, 
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legal or otherwise, because they are not victims. While rejecting the understanding that 
sexual violence is indicative of oppression may be seen as undermining the ability to 
remedy sexual violence, it offers an alternative understanding and perspective to sexual 
violence. By rejecting a gendered view of socialized norms such that men are rapists and 
women are victims, Roiphe defines women as separate from their perceived identity as 
violable. This fundamentally removes gender hierarchy from social relations and by 
extension alters the understanding of sexual violence and how to respond to it. 
 Catherine MacKinnon advocates yet another perspective on sexual violence. 
According to MacKinnon:  
Sexual violence seems assimilated to the difference 
between the sexes, so a women is not considered treated 
unequally when she is victimized […] Women being 
defined as rapable, raping them doesn’t violate them; it 
merely treats them as women. (MacKinnon 2006: 107) 
Here MacKinnon implies that women are defined as being rapable. Through being 
subjects of sexual violence, their identity is changed to fit the understanding that women 
are victims. The change in how female identity is viewed results in defining women as 
being rapable while men are defined as perpetrators Because women are defined as 
rapable, rape becomes decriminalized. It is no longer a violation. This argument asserts 
that women are systemically oppressed as a group and that they are politically and 
socially defined by this oppression. Like Brownmiller, MacKinnon claims all men – 
universally – oppress all women.  
However, in constructing this argument, MacKinnon herself is assigning a role to 
women. In her argument, she establishes women as victims and then uses it as the basis 
of her argument. Furthermore, MacKinnon’s definition of sexual violence against women 
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as both systematic and group based gives woman’s suffering a universality by which both 
women and men are defined by specific roles. Men, universally, are the oppressors while 
women are in need of protection. What does this understanding do for the identity of 
women? While MacKinnon may be voicing a genuine assessment of women’s 
oppression, the specific language she employs codifies who women are and who men are. 
Through MacKinnon’s construction, rigid roles are assigned: Women are victims. Men 
are oppressors.  
 While MacKinnon’s work is both powerful and compelling, it is compelling 
precisely because it is framed in such constrictive terms. MacKinnon paints both men and 
women with such a broad stroke that they are universally defined by the roles she 
constructs. While she acknowledges that there is stratification within gender, the strong 
assertion remains that individual identity is first gender, then race or class. This itself 
implies that roles are assigned from birth. Women are automatically victims because they 
are women. It is this stark assessment that Wendy Brown takes issue with. While 
MacKinnon seeks to frame a problem and propose solutions, Brown on the other hand 
seeks to reveal the multidimensional aspects to the construction of the female identity as 
victim. 
 Taking a different approach to understanding and theorizing female identity, 
Brown acknowledges the power of language and law that MacKinnon overlooks. Brown 
points out that “the more highly specified rights are as rights for women, the more likely 
they are to build that fence insofar as they are more likely to encode a definition of 
women” (Brown 2002: 422). In other words, by encoding a particular perspective, it 
becomes entrenched as the only accepted understanding to the extent that it becomes 
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definitive. MacKinnon’s definition of women would therefore be based solely on their 
identity as victims. As a result, all women are forever established and codified by their 
ability to be victimized. When rights are so specific as to address a particular condition, 
this condition is established as the reality. The identity of women is constructed to be 
“rapable”. Ultimately women’s rights are closely tied to their identities, and therefore 
subject to normative values. Women’s rights are defined within the context of their own 
victimization. 
 Yet Brown also acknowledges that this argument cuts both ways. While gender-
specificity introduces a set of problems in establishing an identity for women, gender-
neutrality does as well. As MacKinnon acknowledges, the more broad and gender-blind 
rights law is, the greater the probability that it will not be employed to the benefit of 
women. The greater the neutrality, the greater the likelihood that women’s needs will be 
eclipsed by male dominance. In effect, the vague aspect to gender-blind law permits a 
broader interpretation and allows for a dominant perspective to prevail without the 
possibility of legal recourse for alternative, subjugated views. In other words, MacKinnon 
argues that without strict legal protection for women, male political power will be able to 
dominate. Because the male perspective is seen as dominant, without paths to legal 
recourse, the female perspective will remain subjugated. Therefore, gender-neutrality also 
holds the potential for entrenching women as victims by perpetuating their oppression by 
the dominant male state.  
Brown introduces a problem that may not be solvable. Her analysis presents a 
duality for women, each of which come with their own complications. The critique of 
MacKinnon’s argument for gender-specificity reveals that addressing male power is not 
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as simple as introducing stricter legal protection. However, MacKinnon’s argument that 
gender neutrality allows for the perpetuation of male dominance remains. Therefore, 
addressing the pervasive nature of this gendered division of power becomes more 
complicated. Furthermore, Brown’s argument establishes the existence of multiple 
perspectives. While MacKinnon speaks of women in universal terms, Brown asserts that 
what oppresses one woman may be empowering to another (Brown 2002: 424). For 
example, while one feminist perspective may understand pornography as sexually 
oppressive, another may assert that it is sexually liberating. These competing feminist 
perspectives introduce multiple ways of framing the issue of sexual violence. What does 
it mean for women as a whole when one perspective is encoded while the other is not? 
When speaking of women as universal, as MacKinnon does, one disallows the 
consideration of race or class. As Brown articulates, is possible to be oppressed by 
multiple forms of social power at once. Which form of oppression is acknowledged as 
being the “most oppressive”? Furthermore, addressing multiple forms of oppression 
sequentially overlooks the race or class within gender. One is not only oppressed by these 
formations, but also defined by them. Therefore, it is important to recognize the 
implications that arise from framing domination based on these identities.  
 Perhaps the complexities of sexual violence are far too complex to be 
encompassed with one overarching theory. MacKinnon’s argument is so powerful 
because it is so straightforward. When analyzing MacKinnon’s theories, it is an open-shut 
case. It is so difficult to take issue with her assertions because they are so succinct. 
However, the broad terms in which she discusses women introduces its own form of 
oppression. Gender specificity establishes women as violable. The role of language 
42 
frames the manner in which we think about women, their identities, and their oppression. 
At the same time, Brown’s argument does not offer a solution. Women are therefore left 
with a dilemma of choosing between a broad understanding of female oppression with a 
limited solution, or a full understanding of female oppression without a clear solution at 
all. Ultimately, the reality of women’s lived experience may be too diverse to be 
encapsulated within current understandings of theorizing sexual violence. 
 
III. Sexual Violence as Lived Experience 
 
 Wendy Brown and Catherine MacKinnon propose two sets of conclusions 
regarding interpreting sexual assault and its role in the lives of women. The fundamental 
disagreement is rooted in the identity of women as it is defined by patriarchal society and 
the victimization women experience because of it. While these two contrasting theories 
seemingly address the implications regarding applying theory to the lived experience of 
sexual violence, it is important to realize that there is no single version of female 
experience in regards to sexual violence. The diversity of women’s lived reality in 
relation to sexual violence may not be completely encompassed by the limitations of 
theoretical application. In many ways, the application of theory to the lives of women 
does not match the nuances of lived experience and its impact on women individually and 
socially. 
 To adequately theorize the lived experience of sexual violence, it must be 
recognized that context matters. It makes a difference whether one is discussing sexual 
violence on college campuses by individuals or perpetuated as state policy. Furthermore, 
within this scale of sexual violence, when discussing lived experience, one is discussing 
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more than the theoretical understanding of women, but the individual. Within women as 
individuals, there is a multidimensional aspect of race, class and ethnicity. This 
fundamentally changes the theoretical understanding of sexual violence because there is 
an aspect of diversity to female experience and our consideration of this diversity is 
limited by our application of theory. The distinctions between MacKinnon’s 
understanding of sexual violence versus Brown’s, for example, demonstrate that there is 
no singular, universal theory that addresses sexual violence. Therefore, our ability to 
understand the lived experience of women is determined by the kind of theory available 
to us. 
 One might discuss the aforementioned example of sexual violence on college 
campuses as one particular context. In this circumstance, a violation occurs between two 
individuals and the issue boils down to consent and circumstance. External factors such 
as alcohol or drugs add layers of complexity to understanding. Even with these factors 
there are further complications. Did the woman ingest these substances by choice? Does 
this change how we view the violation? Should it? Katie Roiphe questions whether or not 
women can even be seen as victims in this context. She asserts that women are 
responsible for their own alcohol and drug consumption, that as adults they are capable of 
being responsible for their own well-being. She dismisses the need for active consent as 
infantilizing, claiming:  
this apparently practical, apparently clinical proscription 
cloaks retrograde assumptions about the way men and 
women experience sex. The idea that only an explicit yes 
means yes proposes that women, like children, have trouble 
communicating what they want (Roiphe 62).  
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While in many ways Roiphe can be seen as dismissing a legitimate crisis on college 
campuses, she also introduces an interesting aspect to sexual violence. Her attack on 
feminist orthodoxy suggests that contemporary theoretical understandings of sexual 
violence may be limiting to the individual female identity. Wendy Brown speaks of the 
complications that arise from encoding one perspective over another. Does encoding the 
perspective that women are victims even within their own personal relations with the 
opposite sex limit their own sexuality, as Roiphe seems to assert? Not only does this 
perspective potentially limit what Roiphe refers to as “sexual ethos,” or the socially 
accepted expression of sexuality, but it also places women in a role of victims unable to 
assert their own desires.  
Yet at the same time, Roiphe’s arguement does not erase the violence that women 
experience. Roiphe overlooks the reality of sexual violence on campus because it does 
not meet her understanding of sexual violence as being forcibly violent. Simply because 
sexual violence occurs at a fraternity party or in a dorm room, does not change that the 
lived experience is characterizes by the individual as sexual assault. Through arguing 
against this view, Roiphe gives us the reassurance that women are more than victims, but 
her perspective diminishes and belittles the complexity of the reality that women 
experience. Furthermore, even if Roiphe prefers to ignore the widespread oppression 
women experience, it does not alter the fact that even at the individual level, women are 
defined by their social roles. Race, class and context matter in characterizing sexual 
violence for individuals. Male dominance and the presence of masculinity is a factor even 
on college campuses, as are the factors of race and class. These factors are palpable 
presences in individual interaction and define the nature of social relationships between 
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individuals. As a result, the understanding of rape in this context is far more complex 
than her analysis would imply. Therefore, the remaining issue becomes how to address 
differences in scale regarding sexual violence and how to adequately theorize the lived 
experience of sexual violence at the individual level. 
 A singular theory cannot be perfectly implemented in instances of lived 
experience, because the universal application of one theory does not encapsulate the 
multiple individual understandings of women in relation to sexual violence, including 
those that take on highly symbolic meaning. Theorist Kristin Bumiller discusses the 
implications of sexual violence when these acts take on symbolic significance in society. 
She cites the Central Park jogger case as an example of “expressive justice,” where the 
case became highly publicized. In this process, the act of sexual violence and the trial that 
followed became more about public spectacle than true “administrative justice” which 
would seek to find a legitimate form of redress. The legal ramifications of the case, which 
will largely be discussed later, had more to do with the symbolic portrayal of the victim 
and the perpetrators than responding to demands for justice. This powerful symbolism 
was derived largely through the racially charged dimension of the case and the depiction 
of the white woman who had been sexually assaulted by a group of minority teens. 
 In relation to theorizing sexual violence, the portrayal of the victim was very 
much one of constructed identity. During the trial, the victim was constructed both 
medically and legally to become a “terrain of verifiability” (Bumiller 46). The individual 
identity of the woman was separated from her body and the two were seen as separate. 
The crime becomes one of pure physical violation and the individual is no longer given a 
voice but is instead defined by the physical events that took place. Through the legal 
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process of attempting to establish the guilt of the minority teens “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” the individual identity and experience of the woman was viewed as far less 
consequential than the evidence of the assault that her body could provide. 
 At the same time, during the Central Park Jogger case, the victim was given an 
intensely symbolic role, due in part to the context of the events that transpired. The 
woman, while going on her daily morning jog, had been attacked and sexually assaulted. 
A group of minority teens were charged with the crime. Because the victim was a young, 
white woman who has been sexually assaulted by a group of Black and Hispanic 
teenagers, the case took on a tone of racial transgression. This perspective was 
constructed in part through the effort of the prosecutor, Elizabeth Lederer, who built a 
racial and sexual narrative to the crime to frame the woman as a symbol of violated 
innocence. In the process of the case, the defendants had been framed as specifically 
targeting a white woman, evoking racially charged images. 
 The iconic representation of the victim as a “white symbol” brings in a morally 
symbolic aspect to the case that lends itself to racialized understandings of theories on 
sexual violence. Yet the racial aspect to sexual violence is often seen as secondary (if it is 
addressed at all) to the gendered aspect of the crime. However, in the case of the Central 
Park jogger, the issue of race was what lent the case to such inflated public spectacle. Yet 
at the same time, it was not only the racial aspect that was the central aspect to the case, 
but the role both race and gender played together. Race and gender became entwined 
throughout the course of the case because of the emotionally powerful image of a white 
woman being victimized by minority men. This evocative imagery stirred racially 
charged sentiment, though this aspect to the case was largely ignored throughout the 
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course of the trial. As a result, the case became more of a political opportunity for 
publicity and catharsis than a means to respond to the need for justice. 
 Yet it is unclear the extent to which race had a role in the actual crime itself. 
Based on available testimony, it was speculated that the sexual assault of the white jogger 
was largely a crime of opportunity and not directed from a position of racial hatred. 
Later, it became apparent that the minority teens were not even guilty for the crime they 
were charged with, yet they spent over a decade in jail for it. Therefore, a dichotomy 
exists between the actual events that transpired and the social understanding of what 
these events mean. In this, the victim is robbed of her individual identity because of the 
symbolic portrayal and the justice that is later carried out is of questionable merit due to a 
dubious understanding of the crime. 
 As a result of the breakdown between actual events and how these events were 
portrayed, the crime and the trial can be seen largely as the general public imposing 
socialized understandings of sexual violence and race relations. Because the case itself 
was so heavily constructed, it suggests that there may be a difference between theorized 
understandings of what sexual violence means and how this sexual violence is portrayed 
and understood in the context of society. In this particular incident, the case being 
constructed as highly racial suggests there exist certain nuances to sexual violence that 
are largely manufactured – in this case, these nuances were based largely in historical 
racism and social understandings of black men as sexually violent and intimidating – 
clouding our understanding of the relationship between sexual violence, and the socially 
defined role of women. 
48 
The duality of theoretical and societal understandings of sexual violence does not 
diminish even in different contexts. Sexual violence can range from the individual to the 
systematic, such as during the Serbian-Bosnian conflict, which resulted in the mass 
violation of thousands of women. While theory may frame women as being universally 
oppressed through attempting to conceptualize a singular female perspective, this still 
differs from systematic sexual violence in the context of state conflict as it is actually 
experienced by women. The context of sexual violence during war gives the crime a 
unique dimension that does not exist during times of peace, even when discussing rape as 
a systematic tool of oppression not only because it involves a state actor, but also because 
sexual violence becomes a tool to undermine an entire ethnic group. 
Widespread rape is not the same as systematic rape during war because of the 
context of the conflict. Widespread rape on an individual level does represent individual 
violation and vulnerability, but this understanding changes during wartime. Rape as a tool 
for war is not only an individual violation, but also a societal one. Despite being removed 
from the fighting women can still be targeted as part of a concentrated war effort. 
However, unlike men they have no substantive way to defend themselves from soldiers 
passing through conquered territory. Women are removed from the violence of battle 
because they are socially defined as vulnerable. Because they are seen as vulnerable, they 
are targeted for exploitation. This understanding of female vulnerability plays a direct 
role in their exploitation. 
Therefore, sexual violence during wartime is directed at women not just 
individually but at the societal level where all women of a particular group are targeted 
because they are perceived as being uniquely vulnerable. Not only are they defined as 
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individually vulnerable, but socially as well in the sense that their violation also 
diminishes the “honor” of their husbands and families. Furthermore, through rape and 
forced impregnation, a wedge is driven through the society and undermines the social 
stability of women and their communities. As a result, sexual violence becomes not only 
a weapon of intimidation but also an enacted war policy with the intent to destroy an 
entire community. When rape becomes a policy in this manner, it is not only the 
individual, systematic act of rape, but also an organized system to dehumanize an entire 
population. Yet this process of dehumanization is not only limited to women. It is 
socially pervasive and undermines the community as a whole, men included. 
Furthermore, there are even more pervasive implications when rape is understood as a 
form of violence that can be exacted not only on women, but also on men. Sexual 
violence does not only originate from a gendered understanding of male-female relations. 
From this nuanced understanding of sexual violence, one is forced to acknowledge that 
there exists a specific and distinct ethnic dimension to rape and that this dimension is 
equally pervasive as the traditional gendered understanding. This form of sexual violence 
has very powerful social implications for women. When women are targeted in this 
manner, it later becomes impossible for them to rejoin their community due to pregnancy, 
psychological and physical trauma and social stigma. All of these factors contribute to the 
systematic elimination of an ethnic group.  
When discussing sexual violence as a tool of violence against an ethnic group, it 
is not only women who are victimized. This in turn alters our perception of rape, its 
importance and what it means for a community as a whole. This particular type of sexual 
violence further differs from certain theoretical understandings of rape because sexual 
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violence on an individual level differs from rape as a systematic war effort. This 
systemized violation is: 
rape under control. […] It is rape as an instrument of forced 
exile, to make you leave your home and never want to 
come back. It is also rape to be seen and heard by others: 
rape as spectacle. It is the rape of misogyny liberated by 
xenophobia and unleashed by official command. It is rape 
to shatter a people, to drive a wedge through a community 
to destroy it. It is rape as genocide (MacKinnon 2006: 38). 
Realizing that rape can also be used as a tool towards genocide alters the theoretical 
understanding of what rape is and what it can do and reveals that there is no singular 
theoretical understanding of sexual violence. It is not only a tool to oppress women, but 
society as a whole. Sexual violence can be used as a tool to oppress an entire ethnic 
group. This interpretation of sexual violence does not eclipse the suffering experienced 
by women, but it does transform how it is understood. In this context, women become a 
target to undermine an entire ethnic group. Women are seen as the means to target an 
ethnic group because they are defined as vulnerable. It is because of this understanding 
that women are systematically targeted as a means to genocide. Therefore, while 
MacKinnon recognizes that rape becomes a tool for ethnic cleansing, she does not 
articulate that the identities that are violated are both individual and collective. Women 
who are targeted for sexual violence as a means to ethnic cleansing are twice oppressed: 
both racially and through gender. Wendy Brown expands upon this idea and asserts that it 
is in fact impossible to separate race and gender. Furthermore, to try to do so is to ignore 
the multiple discourses that define women’s lived experiences (Brown 2002: 427). The 
intersection of these modes of oppression defines the societal role of women and our 
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understanding of women’s interaction with male society. Not only are women 
systematically oppressed by society, they can be targeted as the means to undermine it. 
They are ascribed the role of the most vulnerable and their individual violation is defined 
by its impact on the group as a whole. 
 During the Bosnian-Serbian conflict, sexual violence clearly became a part of a 
strategy of ethnic cleansing. Through rape, the Serbs were able to oppress an entire 
people. It is generally accepted that rape can become a tool through which men oppress 
women. However the Bosnian-Serbian conflict reveals that the violation of women can 
be used in such a manner that enables men to oppress other men. Therefore, in this 
context, rape is not only about individual violation, but collective violation as well. By 
targeting the women of an ethnic group, that entire ethnic group is targeted. Women are 
defined as being vulnerable and in turn become the targeted victims of ethnic cleansing. 
This differs from other understandings of rape as being responsible for the oppression of 
women. It instead suggests that rape is not only sexual; it is ethnic. Sexual violence can 
be used as a means to target an entire population through its victimization. The two 
concepts are entwined and rape becomes defined more by the violence of the act as it is 
directed at a group than by its sexual nature. As a result, women are not targeted just for 
being women. They are targeted because they are vulnerable. They are constructed as 
vulnerable not only because of their gender, but because of their collective and social 
identities. 
 Yet to unequivocally accept this understanding of sexual violence is to overlook 
the other half of the story. Feminist Cynthia Enloe argues that just as women are socially 
constructed, so too are men. Male identity is socially defined in much the same way 
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female identity is. While women are assigned the role of victim, men are assigned the 
role of oppressor and expected to conform to a socially constructed masculine ideal. As 
such, men can be seen as stratified in much the same way women are. Acknowledging 
this reality fundamentally changes how we view sexual violence. Not all men in the 
Bosnian conflict took up arms. Not all men committed murder. Not all men committed 
egregious acts of sexual violence. What does it mean to understand that maleness is not 
always the primary factor in male action? Not all men, even those who have been 
indoctrinated into military culture, commit rape (Enloe 111). The implied affect of 
socialization adds an ungendered aspect to gender violence. While sexual violence as a 
demonstration of masculine traits is informed by social understandings of gender, the 
violence deviates from MacKinnon’s assertion that rape is something that all men commit 
against all women. Sexual violence is ultimately a crime of oppression, indicative of 
power relations. During war, these power relations become defined through militarized 
gender roles. To define all women as victims and all men as oppressors limits this 
understanding of the affect of military socialization and what it means for male-female 
relations. 
 Understanding the variation in context of sexual violence changes not only the 
theoretical understanding of its underlying causes but also our perspective on how to 
remedy the situation. In light of the variation in how sexual violence is employed to 
subjugate women, alter their societal roles, and undermine their ethnic groups, how does 
one codify legal protection? When choosing how to codify protection, perspective 
matters. Not only does this codification seek to redress women’s vulnerability, but it also 
entrenches societal understanding of what sexual violence is, its affect on women and 
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how it defines the role of women in society. If no one theoretical understanding of sexual 
violence can encapsulate the multiple female – and male – perspectives and experiences 
in regards to sexual violence, how can we construct singular, universal laws to address it? 
 
IV. Encoding Protection 
 
It is generally socially understood that the attainment of justice is a sought ideal. 
However there remains the question of who is ultimately responsible for upholding this 
ideal and defending it when it is violated. In regards to women’s rights, it is widely 
debated whether or not the state should be responsible for upholding the ideals of gender 
equality within jurisprudence. While the state can be seen as protector, it can also be seen 
as culpable for the injustices suffered by women. Furthermore, in terms of encoding 
protection, the perspectives of gendered rights beg the question of what it means to 
codify one perspective over all others. In a sense, recognizing one perspective over 
another inherently limits competing perspectives and bounds the agency that women have 
in responding to their disenfranchised reality. However, even in terms of carrying out this 
justice, there remains the issue of how equitable encoding this protection is. While justice 
holds the possibility for remedying the condition of women, it also holds the possibility 
of empty, symbolic justice in which women receive false recourse for their grievances. 
Given the diversity of theoretical perspectives on safeguarding women’s rights, it is 
unclear how to codify these multiple viewpoints in order to offer genuine protection from 
the violation of their inherent rights as citizens. 
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 Gender inequality itself can be seen as the manifestation of a difference in 
political power between men and women. When women are deprived of their basic 
rights, it is demonstrated in their lack of political recourse. According to MacKinnon, this 
would necessitate state involvement, as the state is the seat of political power. The base 
logic is that there exists a political basis to the sexual inequality experienced by women 
and that this in turn calls for an active state role: 
Why isn’t this political? The abuse is neither random nor 
individual. […] It is still systematic and group based. It 
defines the quality of community life and is defined by the 
distribution of power in society. It would seem that 
something is not considered political if it is done to women 
by men, especially if it is considered to be sex (MacKinnon 
2006: 22). 
Here MacKinnon articulates how male privilege in society is reflected in legal norms. By 
arguing that sexuality, when exploited, is not a legal violation, she asserts that male 
power is established as political power. This exploitation directly results in the 
subjugation of women and their limited path of recourse. However, despite the 
implication that the male state is responsible for female oppression, she is of the opinion 
that justice is found through state means and encoding legal protection. Ultimately, 
MacKinnon hopes to seek state involvement in order to codify this protection. However, 
the issue arises whether or not this understanding of sexual violence necessitates state 
involvement. When sexual violence is understood as something committed by men 
towards women, the crime is defined as a gender conflict, which would lend itself more 
to a societal understanding of sexual violence. However, when one acknowledges that the 
gendered aspect of sexual violence is based in the relative political powerlessness of 
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women, the oppression of “all women by all men” becomes political. Once one 
acknowledges that in this manner, the state facilitates and perpetuates the oppression of 
women, it begs the question if seeking solutions from the state truly advances the cause 
of women. The constructed reality of women occurs both socially and politically. 
MacKinnon counters this through the assertion that “this is the law of pornography, the 
law of battered women’s self-defense, the law of rape. Why isn’t this state involvement?” 
(MacKinnon 2006: 24). Given that it is implied that the legal system exists to maintain 
the ideal of justice, viewing the law as the solution for recourse seems almost intuitive. 
However while, as MacKinnon states, it is undoubtedly state involvement, this does not 
necessarily frame the state as the savior of women from male oppression. While the state 
can be the cause of women’s oppression, MacKinnon argues that the state is ultimately 
responsible for upholding their rights. It is this responsibility of the state towards its 
female citizens that necessitates gender specific protection. However, despite the 
compelling nature of MacKinnon’s argument, it is not certain that women should be 
turning to the state. The political vulnerability of women and their relative powerlessness 
to men casts doubt on whether or not women should be regarding the state as responsible 
for their protection at all. If the nature of sexual violence establishes women as victims 
and in a position of political powerless towards male dominance, the state in facilitates 
this subjugation. Therefore, the productive solution may not be to seek political recourse 
from the institution that facilitates female oppression. MacKinnon even declares, “Every 
nation has its fascists; the question is, are they running your government?” (MacKinnon 
2006: 172). It is curious that with her stark assessment of state leadership that she would 
rally so heavily for state involvement in rectifying the violence suffered by women. 
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 By contrast, Wendy Brown takes the viewpoint that sexual violence cannot 
necessarily be rectified by the state because the state is complicit in this oppression. 
While she agrees with MacKinnon that the state may be responsible for the protection of 
women, she asserts that women cannot reasonably go to the state for solving the issue of 
sexual violence. However, this is not due only to the doubt over whether or not the state 
can be viewed as responsible for the protection of women’s rights. She argues that 
women are uniquely oppressed because socially constructed norms are formally 
recognized by a patriarchal state, which has the power to legally encode the societal role 
of women. Going to the state to codify protection holds the possibility for ascribing 
women to a victimized role and entrenching the pre-existing social conditions that 
inherently lead to the sexual violence against women. In Wendy Brown’s view, the state 
can further facilitate oppression when one perspective is encoded over another. In this 
sense, women may not be able to achieve freedom through going to the male state.  
Furthermore, she asserts that the reversal of suffering is not freedom (Brown 7). 
Encoding legal protection may act as a means to distribute political power, but it does not 
necessarily offer recourse from state oppression. Societal norms play a critical role in 
determining who receives political power and who is subjugated by it. Seeking state 
solutions to female oppression equates to the “initial figurations of freedom [that] are 
inevitably reactionary in the sense of emerging in reaction to perceived injuries or 
constraints of a regime from within its own terms” (Brown 7). The state establishes the 
terms by which it interacts with women and their suffering. Women are already 
interacting with state power from a position of relative powerlessness and vulnerability. 
Seeking justice through the state will not succeed in solving the issue of female 
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oppression; it can only succeed in reconstituting it by acknowledging one perspective 
over another. 
 When women negotiate with the state, they negotiate on the state’s terms. They 
operate under state understanding of women’s suffering and oppression. Women face the 
challenge of confronting their own oppression through the state because the state can be 
seen as complicit – or even culpable – for the subjugation of women in society. The state 
has the power to sculpt reality. MacKinnon acknowledges that it is male definition that 
sculpts reality (MacKinnon 1991: 224). The male state sculpts and entrenches societal 
norms. The law codifies these norms and establishes them as fact. Therefore, seeking 
state protection holds the very real possibility of reinforcing women’s position as victims. 
Ultimately, the social and political reality of women is a constructed one. As a result, the 
overlying issue is not only the theoretical underlying causes of female oppression but also 
how to address the lived reality of sexual violence and how to codify protection from it. 
 However, codifying protection from sexual violence comes with its own set of 
complications. We could accept MacKinnon’s line of thinking that gender-specificity 
offers a more comprehensive protection for women. Her argument is that by recognizing 
the specific ways in which women have their rights denied to them, women would have a 
clear path of recourse. As such, women would theoretically be able to hold the state 
accountable for the injustices suffered and legally hold their oppressors accountable. Yet 
even if we assume that the state can theoretically be held accountable for the injustices 
suffered by women, it cannot be ignored that gender-specificity also potentially limits the 
possibility for equality. What does it mean to encode this gender-specific perspective? 
Especially in codifying legal protection, language matters. When marrying a gender-
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specific perspective with jurisprudence, an implied societal role is assigned to women. 
Therefore, in a sense, women are assigned to a state of vulnerability, which then defines 
their identity as women. 
 This perspective is discussed by Wendy Brown as she addresses the implications 
of encoding one female perspective over another. According to her analysis, both 
possibilities introduce complications. While gender-neutral laws can establish the 
persistence of female exploitation by masculine state power, gender-specific laws define 
women as violable. Furthermore, she asks the question of what it means to encode one 
female perspective over another, thereby discounting the ignored perspective. As her 
analysis reveals, there is no singular female perspective. What one woman finds 
oppressive, such as pornography, another woman may find liberating. By choosing to 
encode one of these perspectives would this not, in a sense, deprive these women of their 
own autonomy? While entrenching one perspective may liberate and establish one view, 
it obscures all others because it has been acknowledged as the primary perspective. As a 
result, it may be impossible to encode a gender-specific protection that acknowledges and 
respects multiple female perspectives. 
 Even in encoding these protections, the state capacity to resolve issues is limited. 
Ultimately, the state is faced with the challenge to create order and respond to demands 
for justice while maintaining its own position of power. This lends itself to two distinct 
possibilities. One is the possibility for what Kristin Bumiller calls “administrative 
justice,” or true justice that serves the victims and solves the problem as it is presented. 
The other possibility is “expressive justice,” which is classified more as a political 
opportunity for publicity than a true form of redress. In this form of justice, the legal 
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system is little more than a public spectacle by virtue of its largely symbolic nature. 
Bumiller asserts that expressive justice is the natural response of the state when faced 
with demands for justice and that the state seeks to “reassure an anxious public by 
demonstrating its ability to protect citizens” (Bumiller 36). In this way, the state is able to 
maintain its monopoly of power over gender inequality and gender-based crimes. By 
mounting a symbolic campaign for justice, the state is able to legitimate its own power 
through a false demonstration of legal capacity. While by contrast, administrative justice 
does offer the potential for legitimate redress of social inequalities, the justice system is 
still operating within a socially inequitable society. As a result, the justice that is carried 
out will be inherently limited by the realities of the society within which it operates. 
 When demanding justice for gender inequalities, women should be aware of the 
dual nature of the state. While the state can be seen as protector, it can also embody the 
role of oppressive male power. Ultimately, the state represents a problem of power. The 
exertion of this power, and by extension the oppression of women, is closely tied to 
maintaining this state power. As a result, it may not be possible to entrust female interests 
to a state that represents masculine power. Therefore, while the state may be seen as 
responsible for upholding and defending the rights of its citizens, its inherently unequal 
structure suggests that this struggle for equality may have to occur outside the political 
realm as well as within it.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
 The lived experience of women is very much related to the conceptual 
understandings of social and political dimensions of sexual violence. When confronting 
the reality of sexual violence, it is important to consider how our theoretical 
understanding of male-female relationships and the role of the state inform how we view 
solutions to sexual violence.  
 Within modern contexts, there are two primary conclusions regarding interpreting 
sexual assault and its role in the lives of women. The conclusion advocated by Catherine 
MacKinnon calls for gender specificity, rigorously revising the law to specifically 
address the vulnerability of women. However, Wendy Brown counters this conclusion 
with the concept that gender specificity establishes a rigid understanding of female 
vulnerability and establishes the state as a dominant power in the lives of women. This 
intrusive state force defines the identity of women through legal regulations and 
understandings. Therefore, a paradox emerges in regards to legally encoding protection. 
 This paradox will be explored in the following chapter, which analyzes the 
manner in which political and social responses to sexual violence and gender inequality 
defines gender roles between men and women. While there is a need for justice, problems 
arise when establishing the state as the final arbiter of justice. This state power defines 
the private lives of women and even their socially understood personal identities. 
Therefore, encoding legal protection does not perfectly address the needs or concerns of 
women and does not offer recourse from state oppression. The state establishes the terms 
through which it negotiates with women. In this sense, women are negotiating from a 
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position of relative vulnerability. Seeking justice in the state does not perfectly solve the 
issue of female oppression, though as will be explored, does present women with a 
number of difficult choices when it comes to encoding protection in a way to successfully 
address the oppression experienced by women. 
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Chapter Three: The Law of Equality – Feminist Jurisprudence 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 Previous chapters discussed the role of the state in regards to the legitimization of 
sexuality and desire and addressing sexual violence. This chapter addresses the larger 
issue of state power in upholding citizen’s rights and establishing an equitable society. It 
is impossible to imagine alternative expressions of state power without a fundamental 
understanding of how state power constructs or hinders the evolution of an equitable 
society. MacKinnon explores this issue in what she coins “feminist jurisprudence”. 
Feminist legal theory acknowledges that in many ways, the law has been instrumental in 
the historical subjugation of women. Feminist jurisprudence is an exploration in 
reworking the law and its approach to gender and how the formation of concrete laws can 
advance the rights of women. 
 The relationship between sexuality and state power plays out in a number of ways 
ranging from obscenity laws to regulating prostitution and pornography. The manner in 
which the state regulates these expressions codifies and entrenches heteronormative 
values. Therefore, the relationship between the state and equality becomes a problem of 
power. Political power can be used both for protection and oppression and there are 
significant limits on the language of rights to democratic ends.  
 As such, encoding equality is far more nuanced than MacKinnon’s concrete 
argument would suggest. Theorists such as Wendy Brown and Judith Butler explore the 
nature of political power and the implications of a regulating political force. The process 
of encoding gender equality in many ways establishes female dependence on the state for 
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protection. This dependence changes our understanding of social and political life and the 
extent to which the state promotes the rights of women or emphasizes the normative 
values that have historically prevented women from achieving equality with men. 
Furthermore, this understanding deconstructs notions of a neutral and objective state 
power that upholds a universal standard of individual rights. 
 Feminist jurisprudence as it is framed by MacKinnon deals with codifying 
protection. This is given context by theoretical rights issues in addition to national 
woman’s rights issues such as the Sears Case. The complications of legal redress are 
aptly demonstrated through the 1984 Sears Case, which dealt with a discrimination claim. 
However, counter-claims asserted that a lack of women in high-paying positions was due 
to their personal choice, and not any discrimination on the part of Sears. While the case 
itself was a fairly straightforward discrimination complaint, it raised a host of 
complicated issues which divided the feminist community. This division points at not 
only the surface issue of gender discrimination, but the interpretation of gender roles and 
how to legally address these social distinctions. Therefore, the formative question that is 
raised is whether or not the legal code should incorporate social and cultural differences 
between individuals.  
The tension between whether or not to incorporate difference into gender equality 
has been demonstrated in previous sections and has been a largely divisive issue within 
the topic of feminist jurisprudence. The theoretical and political dimensions of the debate 
played out in the Sears trial through testimony that asserted that women were unlikely to 
prefer or quality for commission sales positions (Milkman 375). While it was also argued 
that women’s interests are ultimately formed by what is made available to them, the 
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claim that Sears had denied women opportunities ultimately failed. Even though the court 
ruling agreed with the claim that women’s interests are best served by law that treats men 
and women as equal. However, controversy remained from the assertion that gender 
inequality arises from sexual difference. The following argument was that public policy 
should therefore take these differences into account when sculpting the law. Yet despite 
this argument, examples of the theoretical divide on articulating rights demonstrate that 
the reality is not so simple. Even during the controversial Sears Case, feminist thinkers 
and activists submitted briefs supporting both sides of the issue. The divisive force of the 
Sears Case alone within the feminist community demonstrate the difficulties and nuances 
involved with theorizing gender equality and conceptualizing a concrete way to address 
the legal rights of women. 
Despite the complications associated with encoding legal rights, several feminist 
thinkers recognize the need for feminist jurisprudence and what political philosopher 
Kenneth Baynes refers to as “the abstract universal” simultaneously. That is to say that 
the ultimate goal is to balance both concrete protection and the understanding of vague 
universal ideals. By striking and maintaining this balance, an understanding of justice and 
how it relates to political and social power emerges. While the state holds the power to 
institute protection of woman’s rights, it is also the mechanism for the political and social 
subjugation of women. 
 
II. Political Power 
 
 Rights can be thought of in several ways. While they can be seen as protection 
and resistance from state oppression, they can also be complicit in what Kenneth Baynes 
65 
coins “the expansion of disciplinary power” (Baynes 453). The manner in which rights 
are constructed enforces state power as the arbiter of justice and as responsible for the 
articulation of civil liberties. Furthermore it is the very existence of the state that allows 
for the legal promotion of social and political rights. Therefore, rights and liberties have a 
markedly political dimension in that they rely on political recognition for their existence. 
Rights are seen as primarily a function of an individual’s inherent liberties outside the 
realm of politics. They are seen as de-politicized and inherent, yet they remain deeply 
interwoven into politics. Despite being seen as natural, rights are intensely political 
because they rely on the affirmation of the political community for their recognition 
(Baynes 457). Because of this deeply political link, rights are both political and social yet 
the institutionalization of rights comes with many limitations. There is a “sharp 
opposition between the concrete particular and the abstract universal” (Baynes 459). This 
is the conflict one is faced with regarding the law of equality, and more specifically, 
gender specificity regarding rights law. 
 This sentiment is echoed by Wendy Brown when she states that rights can “serve 
as mitigation – but not a resolution – of subordinating powers” (Brown 2002: 422). While 
rights are a function of social and political power, the defense of individual rights does 
not truly eclipse state power. In many ways, state power is actually established through 
their defense. To establish political power as responsible for upholding rights entrenches 
the state as a dominant force. Therefore, understanding this dominant political power as 
representing male power establishes the political subjugation of women. 
 As discussed earlier, the domination of women is both politically and socially 
constructed. For example, political and social oppression can be seen as originating from 
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sexual difference. As a result, women have been historically denied equality with men. 
Therefore, male political power is not only politically and socially understood; it is a 
historical construct with female identity being eclipsed by the male state. Male and 
female differences, to an extent, are “consolidated through the ontological disavowal of 
certain activities, vulnerabilities, and labor” and can be culminated through “their 
displacement onto women” (Brown 2002: 429). Wendy Brown analyzes the extent to 
which this division is oriented towards the subjugation of women. She states that in light 
of this male-female dynamic, gender specific rights can have the affect of reinforcing 
traditional conceptions of gender identity. In this way, masculine power is further 
entrenched and the female experience is marginalized, whether that experience is sexual 
assault or motherhood. 
 Given this balance between male and female power, it is important to consider 
what ideological concepts like freedom and justice would look like, especially within pre-
constituted expressions and organizations of state power. For example, liberal defenders 
of democracy may assert that this particular form of governance is freedom from 
oppression and encroachment of individual rights. However, even democracy is simply 
another way in which political power is distributed (Brown 1995: 5). While progressive 
pushes have pressured the state to safeguard the rights of the socially disadvantaged, the 
state still fundamentally represents a problem of power. Ultimately, state interests 
dominate and the political order that facilitates freedom still comes with rules, 
regulations, and domination. 
 For women who have been subjugated by a dominant male state, this poses a 
unique problem. Given the power of the state, legal protection in many ways codifies the 
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very domination that it aims to prevent. In this sense, justice becomes more about 
punishment against perpetrators than about rectifying the disenfranchised position of 
women. Ultimately, women may be in need of greater social equality and protection than 
the legal protection that is capable of reinforcing state power. 
 In this manner, sexual inequality is pervasive, and according to MacKinnon, may 
be universal (MacKinnon 1989: 105). Female powerlessness relative to male political 
power is defined by the gendered social system that reinforces their lack of individual 
autonomy. In this dynamic, the personal is political. The relative powerlessness in 
woman’s personal life is comparable to her relative powerlessness in her public life. The 
social meanings of gender and sex define gender inequality. Male power is the power to 
define and enforce these inequalities through the aggressive male sexual role, cultural 
male dominance, and the social understanding that masculinity is synonymous with 
power (MacKinnon 1989: 127). Female political powerlessness is demonstrated through 
their lack of choice and their inability to negotiate their own identities, which are defined 
as a function of their biology. If political power can be understood as the power of 
choice, women are subject to the male domination that deprives them of personal choice, 
and by extension political power. Gender becomes “a social system that divides power” 
(MacKinnon 1989: 160). As such, gender is inherently a political system. 
 The relative social powerlessness of women is therefore translated as their relative 
political powerlessness. Inequality becomes not only a social issue, but also a political 
and legal one. According to MacKinnon, in legal terms the state is male through its 
adoption of “the standpoint of male power on the relation between law and society” 
(MacKinnon 1989: 163). In other words, the status quo of male and female power 
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relations is maintained through state legislation and the legal legitimization of socially 
constructed normative values. State power is embodied through law and in this manner, 
state power becomes a male, oppressive force. This embodiment protects male power 
through reinforcing existing male control over women and protecting the status quo. 
 Given the role of the state in reinforcing male power, the issue then becomes how 
to confront gender inequality. Gender inequality is both socially and politically 
constructed and reduces women to their socially imposed identities originating from 
sexual difference. However, the protection or expansion of women’s rights is a dubious 
solution when considering the nature of state power. Through turning to the state to 
remedy woman’s relative inequality, its power is reinforced, as is its role as a disciplinary 
power. Viewing the state as the arbiter of justice is to vest it with political power. 
Political power, which is in many way masculine, jeopardizes potential paths of recourse 
for women. This political powerlessness is demonstrated through historical male 
dominance and viewing masculinity to be synonymous with power while women are 
deprived of personal autonomy as a result of biological differences. The political system 
of gender facilitates sexual inequality. The lives of women are defined by this division of 
power, and state legislation defends these norms. Therefore, the question remains of how 
to address how sexuality plays a role in political power and how to encode equality given 
the nature of state power. 
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III. Sexuality and State Power 
 
 The formation of gender hierarchy can be seen as having its roots in sexual 
difference. Difference becomes translated as dominance, politicizing sexual identity. In 
essence, this phenomenon of difference as dominance serves as an enforcement 
mechanism for male dominance by reinforcing traditional normative values (MacKinnon 
1989: 216). Male dominance is both social and political and serves as the basis for sexual 
inequality. Therefore, it is important to consider this relationship between masculine 
power and the state when conceptualizing the laws of gender equality. When the state 
constructs law, it not only constructs and enforces individual rights, but also accepted 
norms. This idea of codifying heteronormative values was explored earlier through 
Michael Warner’s analysis of sexual variance and sexual shame. However, Catherine 
MacKinnon analyzes the role of the state in outlawing the sexual domination of women - 
through its expression of pornography and prostitution - as a means to undermine the 
subjugation of women. According to her conceptualization of state power, sexuality is 
central to dominance. The social construction of female sexuality and the sexual 
dominance of women are later translated into the general political subordination of 
women. Yet, as analyses by Wendy Brown demonstrate, her version of encoding equality 
comes with its own set of implications, demonstrating the complexity of the relationship 
between the state and individual rights and identity. 
 In this context, sexuality both constructs and is constructed by power. The social 
interactions between genders are power relations that are constituted as political. They 
are political because they reflect the authority of male dominance. In this way, “sexuality 
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[…] is a form of power” (MacKinnon 1989: 113). Individuals are divided and defined by 
gender and the imposition of this identity constitutes gender inequality. The relative 
powerlessness of women defines sexual relations between men and women. Pornography 
is a process through which woman’s sexuality is exploited and sold. Prostitution is a 
process through which women become objectified through their physical bodies being 
bought and sold for sex. The existence of both of these forms of oppression codifies and 
perpetuates forms of behavior between men and women. According to MacKinnon, 
pornography contributes to the attitudes and behaviors of discrimination.  
If sexuality is constructed, then pornography, which exploits sexuality, is part of 
that construct. This, by extension, makes pornography implicitly political. When sex and 
pornography become political, they become a matter of hierarchy and power. This would 
suggest that the issue of pornography is a state issue. However, because political power is 
understood as being male by virtue of masculine authority, the state becomes an 
oppressive force that reinforces the sexual exploitation of women. According to 
MacKinnon’s argument, this oppression manifests in a number of ways. She argues that 
because pornography is politically accepted and not functionally illegal, the state is 
giving its tacit approval of its existence. This blurs the line between female victimization 
and female identity (MacKinnon 1989: 113). Woman becomes synonymous with her 
violability. She becomes an object to be used and acquired. This not only establishes 
sexual exploitation as acceptable, but supports its perpetuation. Because women are 
sexually objectified, a social understanding of sex and gender relations is being imposed 
upon them. This constitutes women as sexually available for men and in turn, defined as 
sexually violable.  
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Not only does pornography define female sexuality and identity, it also 
establishes the state and masculine political power as an oppressive, exploitative force. 
That state, in a sense, serves male interests. However, the question remains what the role 
of the state is in sexual politics. Law regarding sex and obscenity aims to control the 
public image of sex. However, even if pornography is publicly repudiated, it remains a 
good for private consumption. Furthermore, pornography is often protection as a right to 
sexual expression. In this manner, the state “preserves both the value and the ability to 
get what it purports to devalue and restrict access to” (MacKinnon 1989: 214). Even with 
obscenity law, pornography remains an accepted and legitimate practice. This provides 
state authorization for pornography as an accepted reality. This, coupled with 
pornography’s power to define female sexuality and identity, forms an expression of 
gender inequality. Sexual relations are politically defined, and so to is pornography, as it 
both reflects and defines sexual interaction. However, the issue at hand is not only sexual 
interaction, but also the political and social status of women. 
The solution to MacKinnon’s conceptualization of pornography and gender 
relations is more gender specific laws and regulations. By her logic, through codifying 
explicit protection to end the expression of sexual exploitation, the state can no longer be 
complicit in the subjugation of women. Her approach emphasizes that because gender 
difference is the basis for gender inequity, these differences should not be masked by the 
law of gender neutrality, but taken into account by it in the formation of gender specific 
codifications. Her argument emphasizes the point that it is only by recognizing these 
sexual differences and the impact they have on gender relations, can the state remedy the 
situation and provide women with paths to recourse.  
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However, at the same time, it should also be considered that emphasizing 
women’s difference to men through law comes with a set of complications when 
attempting to achieve rights equality. Through gender specificity and emphasizing sexual 
difference, the result is emphasizing the very sexual dominance that has historically 
precluded the achievement of gender equality. Furthermore, MacKinnon’s argument in 
many ways represents a simplification of social life. Even the feminist perspective is 
given context through social situations. Wendy Brown explores this point of view in her 
analysis of MacKinnon’s assertions regarding pornography. To reduce political inequality 
to the sexual differences between men and women is to devolve every feminist issue to 
sexuality. In this manner, women are in a constant state of violation. She argues that the 
complexity of sexuality cannot be reduced to the dynamic of sex roles between men and 
women and to do so is to oversimplify social roles. Furthermore, for women to turn to the 
state as the solution to their exploitation is to encourage a female dependence on the state 
as a protector (Brown 1995: 168). In this sense, to legally codify gender specificity is to 
also encode the social construction that necessitated it and to emphasize female 
powerlessness. This too, assigns a specific role to women. Therefore, the relationship 
between sexuality and state power is not as straightforward as specifying greater legal 
protection for women. Ultimately, encoding equality has far greater implications for the 
state of women and their relationship with power, masculinity and the state. 
While MacKinnon’s analysis of gender inequality as how it relates to sexuality 
provides an option to women for political forms of empowerment, it is not without its 
complications in terms of encoding equality. As Wendy Brown points out, the 
relationship between social expressions of sexuality and encoding sexual equality is in 
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many ways a paradoxical one. Gender specificity can be both at once “politically 
essential and politically regressive” (Brown 2002: 432). Therefore, in order to progress 
socially and politically with encoding gender equality, these paradoxes must be 
addressed. 
 
IV. Articulating Rights and Encoding Equality 
 
 The relationship between encoding gender equality and the state is a paradoxical 
one. As Wendy Brown articulates, the legal specificity that Catherine MacKinnon 
advocates has the power to be both politically progressive and regressive. This paradox 
originates from the aspects of state power and the implications of women turning to the 
state in order to seek redress for social and political ills. Therefore, the language of rights 
becomes important when encoding equality. The gender specificity that MacKinnon 
defends both protects women and entrenches their identity as victims, whereas gender 
neutrality operates in vague terms that allows for the perpetuation of female 
victimization. Wendy Brown and Kenneth Baynes analyze this dimension to rights 
language as well as the social function of rights. In the same vein, Kristin Bumiller looks 
at the implications of this theoretical paradox in the lives of rape victims and battered 
women who turn to state support services. Ultimately, the complications of articulating 
rights and redressing the inequality suffered by women must be overcome if gender 
equality is to be realized. In establishing feminist jurisprudence, it is important to 
understand the implications of the language of rights in encoding gender equality. 
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 The value of rights language for women is an obscure one. Wendy Brown 
explores this concept in her analysis of means to encode equality. One concept she 
explores is the idea of an individual both wanting and needing rights. In this manner, 
even if an individual’s rights remain unfulfilled, they still shape our desire because “we 
are constrained to need and want rights” (Brown 2002: 421). In other words, even when 
rights are not obtained, we are still constrained and defined by our desire to attain them. 
She points out that this lack of attainment by women is largely historical. Furthermore, 
the lack of redress of these ills throughout history up until modern day demonstrates that 
rights often do not offer a resolution to domination. While she admits that rights may ease 
the vulnerability of women, they “vanquish neither the regime nor its mechanisms of 
reproduction” (Brown 2002: 422). Therefore, while on an individual level, codifying 
equality may provide a form of redress to the violation of individual rights, it does not 
solve the origin of the problem or subvert the social and political domination that 
facilitated it. The paradox of rights does not originating in lessening its affects. She 
argues that there is nothing inherently wrong with mitigating the effects of inequality. 
Instead, the problem arises with the formulation of rights and if their specific formulation 
challenges the dominating force or simply regulates it. While the challenging of this force 
would allow for an escape from subordination, the regulating aspect would simply “build 
a fence around us at that site” (Brown 2002: 422) and continue to define us as victimized. 
This is where the previously mentioned gender specificity versus gender neutrality debate 
plays a critical role. The importance of language in vocalizing gender rights is 
demonstrated through this duality. Highly specified rights fence women in through their 
power to encode a definition and then assign it universally to women. However, as 
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Catherine MacKinnon rightly points out, gender neutrality fails to adequately address the 
needs of women or prevent the violation of their rights by men. This is where the paradox 
arises because rights are never employed absent of a normative context. Therefore, 
women would be deeply defined by gender-specific rights, which have the power to 
define them as victims and subordinate to men. At the same time, gender-neutral rights 
allow the continued violation of female rights, also entrenching the subordinate status of 
women. This has resulted in what Kenneth Baynes as coined an “increasing skepticism 
and suspicion about the value of rights” (Baynes 452). Rights as they are currently 
conceived often simply reiterate preexisting expressions of power. As Kristin Bumiller 
demonstrates, this plays out in a very real way for women who are struggling against a 
male dominant state. 
 This struggle against the male dominant state becomes further complicated when 
women seek help from the state. Bumiller confronts these complications and how they 
relate to crime control and state services to victims of rape and battery. She argues that 
while the goal has been to expand victim services, it has also had the effect of authorizing 
“legal, medical, and therapeutic interpretations of victims’ experiences and needs” 
(Bumiller 96). In this manner, while the main objective may have been to empower 
women, the individual needs of these women are also muted by dominant state discourse 
of imposed interpretations of victims’ needs. This dynamic is reminiscent of the paradox 
presented by Wendy Brown. While a lack of victim services would leave women 
vulnerable, their expansion also imposes a state-sanctioned interpretation of female 
victimization. Furthermore, Bumiller points out that women who go to the state seeking 
aid become dependent upon it. This dependence allows the state assert its authority over 
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women because they are dependent upon the state to provide for them in order to escape 
violence and seek redress for the violation of their individual rights (Bumiller 97). In 
addition, because the state is providing these services, the state also creates the structural 
conditions that facilitate the dependence of women. These structural conditions are 
realized through state sanctioned and organized support. However, because the individual 
rights of these women have been violated, they are not in a position to resist the state’s 
dominance. In encoding equality, these victim services and reforms to victim services 
often either fail to address or aggravate the victimization of women by furthering their 
dependence on the state. Yet at the same time, without access to these victim services and 
rights, women would remain in a state of victimization. Therefore, when encoding 
equality, especially in regards to physical violation, the individual aspects of women’s 
situations and the systematic social disadvantage women experience must be accounted 
for.  
 The paradoxical nature of encoding gender equality leaves us with a conundrum 
that may not be solvable within the current social and political context. Imagining a mean 
to address this context is the concept behind feminist jurisprudence. Feminist 
jurisprudence attempts to imagine a means to use rights language and encode gender 
equality. However, as Wendy Brown and Kristin Bumiller demonstrate, the language of 
rights is complicated and brings into question the very legitimacy of rights law. While the 
state is seen as a protector, it is also an imposing, dominant force. The use of certain 
language when encoding rights not only encodes a certain understanding to female 
victimization and identity, it also promotes female dependence on the state for protection. 
However, to disregard the specific rights language that potentially offers protection is to 
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further facilitate the perpetuation of the status quo and the victimization of women. This 
paradox remains a theoretical battle without a clear solution. The question then becomes 
how feminist jurisprudence deals with modern feminist debates and tries to redress the 
social and political ills of women. Ultimately, there may not be a clear answer and the 
issue of encoding equality will remain a paradoxical one in light of current 
understandings of male-female dynamics and state power. 
 
V. Feminist Jurisprudence 
 
 Confronting the paradox of encoding gender rights in order to incorporate a 
feminist perspective is the general goal of constructing feminist jurisprudence. Feminist 
jurisprudence is the integration of feminist theory to the legal system with the objective to 
both explain how the law has played a role in the subordinate status of women and to 
ameliorate this status through changing the law and its treatment of gender equality. 
However, as Kristin Bumiller and other feminist thinkers demonstrate, the involvement 
of the state in establishing gender equality complicates the objective of subverting male 
dominance. At the same time, Catherine MacKinnon rightly articulates the danger of the 
vagueness of gender-neutral law. Operating outside of the state is to operate outside of 
the dominant legal power, limiting paths of redress. Therefore, sculpting feminist 
jurisprudence is a difficult task when encoding rights. This difficulty can be seen through 
the theoretical conflict over vocalizing individual rights. In addition, the difficulty of 
encoding rights can also be actively demonstrated in the modern legal system, such as 
during the controversial Sears Case of 1984, which dealt with the claim that the 
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underrepresentation of women in high-paying commission sales positions was not due to 
discrimination, but the preferences of the female workers themselves. When sculpting 
feminist jurisprudence, the base logic is that because there is a political basis to sexual 
inequality, state involvement is necessary. However, within society’s current context, this 
involvement presents additional complications.  
 Involving the state in order to confront the political subjugation of women is a 
perilous endeavor. While the state represents the formative legal entity, it ultimately 
represents the problem of power. Masculine power plays a pivotal role in the subjugation 
of women. Therefore, when women turn to the state for legal recourse, they are 
essentially seeking freedom from the very force that is responsible for their oppression. 
Given women are operating from a position of relative powerlessness, negotiating on the 
state’s terms may be a fruitless endeavor. At the same time, without this negotiation, 
women’s options for pursuing political equality are narrowed. Being of the opinion that 
equality is achievable through state action, Catherine MacKinnon argues that sexual 
violence is a product of sex inequality. This sexual inequality itself is based in a 
difference of political power between men and women. She claims that this political basis 
inherently necessitates state involvement:  
 
Why isn’t this political? The abuse is neither random nor 
individual. […] It is still systematic and group based. It 
defines the quality of community life and is defined by the 
distribution of power in society. It would seem that 
something is not considered political if it is done to women 
by men, especially if it is considered to be sex (MacKinnon 
2006: 22). 
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Here MacKinnon critiques the lack of political action in regards to gender inequality. 
This gender inequality manifests in a number of ways ranging from sexual violence to the 
political disenfranchisement of women. However, this disenfranchisement is not simply 
the problem of an overly powerful state, but an exclusively masculine one that targets and 
disenfranchises women, specifically. This political imbalance between genders is directly 
involved in the relative powerlessness of women to men. However, because as discussed 
earlier, political power has been historically constituted as male, it is not considered to be 
a political problem. Yet in the terms which MacKinnon uses to frame the situation, it is 
undoubtedly political. However, this does not meet that political action will solve the 
problem. As Wendy Brown articulates, negotiating politically “frequently recycle[s] and 
reinstate[s] rather than transform[s] the terms of domination that generated them” (Brown 
2002: 7). In other words encoding individual rights can mitigate the effects of a dominant 
state, but does not subvert state power. Instead, the terms in which an individual 
negotiates with the state is altered, even if the mechanisms of power are left unchanged. 
Therefore, the goal of feminist jurisprudence of reworking the law to alter the legal 
notion of gender is far more complicated than it seems. Ultimately, state power is not so 
easily subverted or altered. 
 The goals of feminist jurisprudence appear fairly straightforward at first glance. In 
essence, the objective is to example the role of law in the subjugation of women and to 
alter the law to incorporate the female perspective in regards to gender inequality. 
However, the problem arises through not only the difficulty of establishing a singular 
female perspective, but how to go about incorporating this perspective. Previous sections 
80 
have outlined the theoretical struggle of vocalizing rights. The language of rights leaves 
women with a paradox that is not easily solved. Modern examples of this dynamic are 
played out in the legal system, such as during the Sears Case. These examples and voices 
from the contemporary feminist debate demonstrate that while feminist jurisprudence 
may seek legal redress for women, the reality is far more nuanced than might appear. 
Both the characteristics of a dominant masculine state, as well as the paradox of 
introducing a gendered perspective leave women caught in a paradox that is not easily 
solved. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 As demonstrated, contemporary feminist debate centers on the language of rights 
and the process of encoding equality. Gender inequality, originating in many ways from 
sexual difference, plays out not only socially, but also politically. Sexuality, which can be 
interpreted as being socially constructed, manifests not only through social interactions, 
but also through political actions and the legal system that facilitates the subjugation of 
women. The manner in which the state regulates these social and political interactions has 
the power to codify and entrench historical normative values and gender differences. 
 While political power can be used for protection, it can also be a tool of 
oppression. As such, there is a limit to the ability of rights law to effectively promote 
equality. Therefore, solving the problem of equality is not as straightforward as making 
laws more gender-specific. On the contrary, gender specificity can reinforce female 
vulnerability. Furthermore, looking to the state to resolve the problem of gender 
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inequality bolsters state power and solidifies its role as protector. In this manner, women 
become dependent upon the state for the redress of social ills.  
Feminist jurisprudence looks to the state to alter the role the state has played in the 
subjugation of women, yet this is not so easily done. Both Wendy Brown and Kenneth 
Baynes point out that within the current context, the paradox between gender-neutrality 
and gender-specificity will continue to perpetuate. While the state holds the power to 
formulate the protection of women’s rights, it is also capable of instituting the political 
and social subjugation experienced by women. In light of this reality, the resulting 
conclusion is to imagine an alternative conception of social and political male-female 
relations, feminist jurisprudence, and the role of the state in negotiating these 
relationships. This process of re-imagining, which will be explored in the following 
chapter, allows for the conception of alternative understandings of male-female political 
relationships. Given the paradox associated with encoding legal protection against the 
social ills experienced by women, re-imagining the social and political context of male-
female interaction, in addition to reconsidering the formation of traditional gender roles, 
is critical to responding to gender inequality in socially and politically effective ways.  
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Chapter Four: Re-imagining Gender 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 Women are confronted with numerous challenges when it comes to addressing the 
relative inequality they experience in their social and political lives. Previous chapters 
have demonstrated that in regards to sexuality, sexual violence, and interacting with the 
state on these two matters, there are numerous issues that arise. The nature of state power 
defines how gender inequality is addressed in relation to sexuality and sexual violence 
and the options that are presented to women to confront their socially and politically 
understood vulnerabilities. 
 An analysis of the relationship between gender equality and the state reveals a 
duality that arises: encoding legal protection through political means or opting for a 
gender-neutral approach. This dichotomy presents women with a choice when encoding 
protection. However, both choices have significant drawbacks within modern 
understandings of gender relations. 
 Therefore, re-imagining gender and traditional male-female relationships allows 
us to re-examine the social and political contexts of gender relations. While previous 
chapters addressed specific issues, this chapter analyzes the larger issue of context, using 
the work of theorists explored in earlier chapters. One possibility to address the 
dichotomy of encoding rights is to consider the manner in which we understand gender 
and state power. A re-evaluation of this relationship opens up a new realm of possibility 
for women in terms of their rights and addressing the vulnerabilities the experience. 
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II. Re-thinking Sexual Identity 
 
 Biological conceptions of gender inequality have asserted that sexual dominance 
has its origins in sexual differences. In this sense, both men and women become defined 
by their social roles by virtue of their biological origin. By basing this sexual dominance 
in immutable biological identity, gender roles become part of an individual’s inherent 
identity that defines the social and political lives of men and women. Both Jessica 
Benjamin and Judith Butler challenge the immutability of biological identities to reveal 
how they impact the lives of women. At the same time, their explorations of alternative 
interpretations of the origins gender divisions allow for re-imagining gender binary and 
redefining gender in flexible terms, as opposed to the rigid confines of biology. This 
exploration allows us to re-conceive gender roles and imagine alternatives to the pre-
conceived norms that define the lives and identity of women. This is not to say that 
sexual difference does not exist and impact the lives of individuals in very real terms. 
Instead, this process of redefining gender roles is placing traditional conceptions of 
biological identity in a different context. By rethinking the context in which individuals 
function, one is able to question prescribed gender identities. This re-imagining is a 
crucial first step to reforming how gender inequality is confronted on social and political 
levels. 
 Unequal gender relations can be imagined as male and female roles as being two 
unequal halves of a whole. Jessica Benjamin conceptualizes male and female roles as 
being socially understood in this manner based on historical gender divisions. The gender 
dominance that manifests is an expression of a failure of integration and mutual 
recognition between the two halves. In other words, when there is a lack of mutual 
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recognition of the separate male and female identities, dominance occurs because one 
side is devalued while the other is idealized. The origins of this process, she argues, is an 
imbalance between the assertion and recognition of individual identity that originates as 
early as infancy when male children disidentify with the female mother based on sexual 
differences. When this disidentification occurs, the female identity is devalued while the 
male identity is idealized through the assertion of the male child’s identity when he is 
unable to achieve mutual recognition with the mother. In this manner, Benjamin states 
that the masculine identity is the “mirror that reflects the self as it wants to be” (Benjamin 
100). In other words, the masculine identity is idealized through disassociation with the 
mother’s female identity and the assertion and dominance of male authority. The 
assertion of the male identity is based in the struggle to maintain an individual identity in 
spite of the disassociation with the mother (Benjamin 181).  
However, despite the appearances of a fixed gender polarity, Benjamin makes it 
clear that this development of a divided gender duality is not the only possibility. She 
argues that women themselves can subvert this polarity by choosing to assert their own 
subjective identities. By rejecting an assigned identity and establishing individual 
subjectivity, women create a new possibility of gender relations. Rather than engaging in 
the struggle against masculine dominance, women are able to “offer men a new 
possibility of […] becoming alive in the presence of an equal other” (Benjamin 221). In 
other words, women can reframe their own social roles to alter the traditional conceptions 
of complementary, but unequal roles. She further argues that this possibility has become 
plausible in a modern sense through the female demand for equality and the growing 
social acceptance of gender equality. This substantive change makes this possibility 
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“more than a utopian abstraction” (Benjamin 221). Instead, these developments are 
material progress towards altering the traditional norms of male and female interaction. 
She acknowledges that the reality of biological difference is inevitable in a way, but she 
states that it is not inevitable that this difference will reduced to a male-female binary. 
The social re-imagining that she advocates is already in progress. She points out that the 
body of work offered by feminism offers a new possibility of imagining gender. In terms 
of the problem of recognition being translated as dominance, feminism allows for a new 
possibility of mutual recognition by confronting the unequal reality of male-female 
relationships. Uncovering this reality and understanding is a means to confront it and the 
defining effect it has on social relations. In this manner, theoretical alternatives can be 
realized as social progress. 
Judith Butler echoes the sentiments of Jessica Benjamin in her analysis of gender 
relations as how they relate to patriarchal family structures. She argues that despite 
biological differences, family structure and relationships are dependent upon social 
practices and norms. According to Butler, “there is no symbolic position of Mother and 
Father that is not precisely the idealization and ossification of contingent cultural norms. 
To treat these variable norms of presuppositions of culture […] is to divorce the 
psychoanalysis of sexual difference fully from its sociological context” (Butler 2004: 
158). In other words, Butler acknowledges that there is a psychological and biological 
component to sexual difference, but that it is closely linked with cultural and social 
understandings. By revealing the cultural aspect to the symbolic understanding of 
masculine and feminine roles, it is possible to have a scope of understanding beyond the 
preconceived notions of social normativity. As Butler illustrates, to treat variable norms 
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as fixed is to restrict the imagining of alternatives. In this manner, alternatives that defy 
the symbolic conceptions of family life, such as gay couples or single mothers, are seen 
as being illegitimate. Theoretically re-imagining these normative values is the first step in 
the process of challenging traditional ideals. Butler states that it is crucial to have a 
theoretical framework that allows for alternatives (Butler 2004: 159). To not allow for 
these alternatives is to devalue the implementation of expressions of identity that defy 
traditional values. By realizing that gender divisions are largely cultural, it is possible to 
re-imagine how these roles define social life. Like Benjamin, Butler realizes that a 
theoretical framework that allows for cultural re-imagining makes a very real difference 
in the lives of individuals and the implementation of gender roles. A theoretical 
framework that allows for these differences would no longer stigmatize homosexual 
relationships, single mothers, or other social realities as deviations from an idealized 
norm. In this manner, theoretical dialogue that confronts these realities has a very real 
impact on the construction of gender roles and social values. 
Both Judith Butler and Jessica Benjamin analyze symbolic gender roles as a 
starting point for the development of sexual dominance and gender inequality. The norms 
that govern social interaction fail to accurately encapsulate the nuances of an individual’s 
identity. When one reconsiders these traditional norms, it is possible to re-imagine the 
traditional notions of identity. Theoretical re-imagining, along with a reconsideration of 
the real imbalances of social life, is a first step to understanding and confronting social 
and political gender roles. New theoretical frameworks that allow for material 
alternatives and deviations from the traditional accepted norms allow this progress to 
occur. In this sense, the feminist theory and gender politics that has emerged in recent 
87 
years questions and reconstitutes traditional understandings of social roles to reflect real 
life. This reconstitution is a vital building block for challenging gender norms that define 
female identity. 
 
 
III. Social Conceptions of Gender Identity 
 
 What is and is not socially acceptable in many ways defines individual identity. 
Normative values define what is acceptable and what expressions of individual identity 
fall within this norm. Ultimately, these norms have a markedly definitive quality and 
assign a rigid understanding to individual identity. To fall outside the accepted norm is to 
invite criticism and shame. Michael Warner uncovers this concept of accepted 
expressions of identity as how they relate to homosexual expressions of sexuality and 
desire. The heteronormative values that purport a singular accepted form of individual 
expression define the lives of all individuals, as there are inevitably deviations from any 
norm. However, the further one is from the norm, the greater scrutiny one is subjected to. 
Confronting this reality and understanding how it is applied to social relations establishes 
a means to imagine an alternative to heteronormative roles. An alternative theoretical 
framework allows us to re-imagine social roles as they relate to all individuals. This 
theoretical understanding defines not only the social acceptance of sexual identity, but 
also the manner in which this understanding is encoded in both political and legal terms. 
 In Michael Warner’s terms, controlling the sexuality of others is the basis of 
understanding morality. This, he argues, is the origin of regulation, norms and 
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prohibition, as well as the deep sense of cultural shame that is associated with sex. 
However, he argues that this sexual shame is political when sexual behavior and gender 
identity becomes regulated. This sexual politics defines the identity of all individuals 
whose sexual identity is not seen as legitimate. The shame associated with this 
illegitimacy imposes the concept of a genetic heteronormative sexuality that is seen as the 
only legitimate expression of sexual identity. This social understanding of sexuality 
informs political regulation of sexual expression and by extension, mandates a legitimate 
identity. He argues that this theoretical idealizing of a sexual norm has very real 
implications, particularly for the homosexual community, which has experienced the 
regulation and “zoning out” of their expression of sexual identity.  
Warner examines the social persecution of gay sexuality through the public 
concern over obscenity and scrutiny of the “public culture” of sex (Warner 171). This has 
resulted in the disappearance of gay bars, sex shops and other public forms of gay sexual 
expression. This disappearance has been defended as protecting “community values,” 
causing Warner to express nostalgia for the gay neighborhoods in New York City that 
were heavily regulated to the point of disappearance. While he feels that this process has 
resulted in gays being forced to “return to the closet,” there is no clear solution to the 
concerns he voices. The publicity of sex in many ways contributes to its being viewed as 
abnormal and while the zoning out of gay sexual expression has regulated individual 
sexual identity, this regulation was in many ways prompted by the public culture of 
sexuality. Furthermore, as Warner himself explores, members of the gay community have 
disassociated themselves from the public expression of sexuality due to the efforts of the 
gay movement to be seen as more than gay sex. The public versus private nature of sex 
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fundamentally changes how sexuality is socially viewed. Rethinking social 
understandings of sexuality is met with this division. Sexual expression is viewed as 
being separate from the public sphere, despite being regulated by social understandings 
of individual sexuality. Michael Warner calls for a “new standard of dignity” (Warner 
74), referring to the social stigma and shame that is assigned to those who deviate from 
the accepted norm.  
However, redefining this standard is not only a social process, but an inherently 
political one as well. When homosexual identity becomes the target of social censorship, 
the state is involved. Furthermore, it is state involvement that has the power to regulate 
and legitimize homosexual relationships through the institution of marriage. At the same 
time, Warner is not immediately accepting of the idea of homosexual marriage because it 
is a mechanism that allows the state to regulate personal relationships. In addition, 
marriage is used as a means to distribute many rights and privileges (Warner 89). 
Through this mechanism, marriage becomes a means to achieve state validation and 
integrate into the culture of marriage, which legitimizes personal relationships. While this 
might beg the reaction of promoting gay marriage, this is not Warner’s immediate 
response. It is true that marriage would give the legitimacy that homosexuals, who have 
been exposed to social stigma, seek. However, Warner also states that this possibility 
would also be a means for marriage to “tame” homosexuals into conforming to an 
accepted norm (Warner 141). Therefore, the re-imagining that Warner seeks cannot be 
achieved through either social or political means alone, but through both. It is not a 
simply matter of legalizing gay marriage or allowing the expansion of sex shops, but also 
of rethinking the relationship between social norms, public persecution of deviations 
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from that norm, and the selective legitimacy that the state offers. As opposed to finding a 
means to fit homosexual identities into current conceptions of sexuality and sexual 
norms, cultural acceptance of alternatives to heteronormative identity needs to be 
established. 
 What is normal dictates what should be. The idealization of this norm demands 
conformity to it and invites shame upon those who fail to do so. The shame experienced 
by the gay community has resulted in the de-sexualization of the gay and lesbian 
movements. The shame associated with supposedly “deviant” sexual practices has 
resulted in the attempt to separate sexual identity from sexual practices. Michael Warner 
illustrates the manner in which social norms dictate individual identity and the need to re-
conceptualize our understandings of individual sexual identity. The manner in which 
current understandings define individual identity has caused Warner to call for a new way 
of understanding sexuality in order to break the association between what differs from the 
norm and what is considered shameful (Warner 74). However, this new standard of 
dignity is not only a theoretical conception; it also requires a social implementation and 
acceptance of alternative forms of expression. The increasing acceptance of the gay 
movement has demonstrated that reframing traditional understandings of sexuality is 
possible, yet social idealizations of a norm still exist. Therefore, altering conceptions of 
heteronormative values requires not only social acceptance by political action as well. 
The regulation and “zoning out” of sex experienced by members of the heterosexual 
community is political action, which necessitates state involvement. However, as has 
been demonstrated, the involvement of the state also introduces the threat of a state-
enforced selective legitimacy. Because it is unclear how to reframe social understandings 
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in a manner that promotes sexual identity, a question then becomes raised as to how the 
state responds to a call for a “new standard of dignity” in light of the subjectivity of 
personal sexual identity. Concrete state response to an undefined standard is a dubious 
venture due to the wide variance Michael Warner attributes to sexual identity. Therefore, 
this new standard, in practice, may be realized through state recognition of homosexual 
rights as a means to de-stigmatize non-normative sexual relationships. As a result, re-
imagining desire is not only a social reconstruction, but an inherently political one as 
well.  
 
 
IV: Political Alternatives to Establishing Gender Equality 
 
 Codifying solutions to gender inequality has presented women with a paradox. As 
explored in earlier chapters, a problem arises when navigating between gender specificity 
and gender neutrality. The law of equality is forced to mediate between these two sides 
and each presents its own problems that need to be addressed. Wendy Brown, a 
prominent voice in exploring this dichotomy, does not offer a clear solution, but does 
suggest that traditional ways of conceptualizing political solutions to gender equality 
need to be rethought. This assertion directly conflicts with Catherine MacKinnon’s 
argument, which is staunchly for gender specificity in the law in order to protect women. 
While this position runs the risk of regulating sex and the sexual lives of women, she 
offers a clear solution to the social and political ills women face. She examines this 
process of codifying protection and its successes not only on the national level, but the 
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international level as well. Yet Kristin Bumiller also demonstrates how this form of 
regulation has hurt women and failed to achieve the progress that has been sought. The 
work of these theorists demonstrates the issue of state power when establishing political 
solutions and alternatives. While the state is traditionally viewed as the arbiter of justice 
and equality, the paradox faced by women reveals that an invasive state force in the lives 
of women often fails to deliver the equality it promises. 
 Wendy Brown characterizes traditional conceptions of reversing and subverting 
male power to be largely reactionary. In other words, much of feminist responses to male 
power have emerged from a reaction to injuries suffered as a result of an oppressive 
regime (Brown 1995: 7). However, she stresses that simply subverting and reversing this 
oppression would not be the attainment of freedom. She states while “workers [may] 
dream of a world in which work has been abolished, blacks [may] imagine a world 
without whites, feminists [may] conjure a world either without men or without sex” 
(Brown 1995: 7) this would effectively be a mirrored reversal of suffering, not 
reconstituting the mechanism of oppression. Therefore, it is not possible to undo the 
suffering of women simply by legally regulating sexual exploitation and punishing those 
who violate these regulations. This manner of approaching political inequality establishes 
the law as a mechanism for punishment, not the liberation of women. Formatting state 
power in this manner does not establish justice for women, but in many ways expands the 
pervasiveness of state power by vesting it with the power to impose laws and establish 
rights.  Given the nature of state power, how can one be expected to confront the paradox 
facing women? The solution instead may be to balance between social equality and 
protection as a means to bypass the effect of the law codifying the powerlessness of 
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women it is aiming to prevent. The subjectivity of the social life makes the law a blunt 
instrument to confront the ills suffered by women. It is possible to alter social 
conceptions of gender equality by exploring if and how women are so relentlessly 
victimized by gendered constructions. In addition, examining subjective identity as to 
how it relates to political argument begins a collective discourse that allows us to explore 
options for the redress of female suffering. While this blurs the line between state and 
civil society, it also attempts to avoid placing the issue of resolving gender inequality 
solely in the hands of an oppressive state. In this manner, a potential partnership can be 
formed between political action and social discourse. It is possible to articulate and 
examine social progress outside the bounds of state power. In this manner, it is possible 
to resituate social and political boundaries. 
  By contrast, Catherine MacKinnon relentlessly advocates that gender inequality 
is irreducibly political. She argues that it is state policy that promotes and facilitates the 
suffering of women and as such, the solution is a straightforward one. This is the basis for 
MacKinnon’s campaign to increase regulation and codify protection against the 
collection of women’s social and political ills. MacKinnon asserts that legal equality is 
the tool for revealing social conditions and reforming them (MacKinnon 2006: 107). 
However, she does not offer a solution to the fact that this manner of confronting gender 
inequality expands state power. MacKinnon both views the state as an oppressive entity 
in that it facilitates the suffering of women, and also the solution to female oppression 
through politically codifying equality. However, this duality may not be easily solved by 
legal regulation. Despite MacKinnon’s solution of turning to the state, she also states that 
thus far, equality law has largely succeeded in giving men access to rights that have been 
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historically uniquely female, such as mother’s benefits, child custody, and alimony – 
without succeeding in providing women the equality they seek (MacKinnon 2006: 73). 
Therefore, the law may not be able to capture the nuances of social life and gender 
inequality as elegantly as MacKinnon envisions, despite her proposal of a concrete 
solution. 
 Kristin Bumiller recognizes this obstacle when examining the effect of state 
power in the lives of women. In her work examining the recent political campaigns 
against sexual inequality, she views the expansion of state power as problematic to 
achieving gender equality. The expansion of state power and the establishment of the 
state as the protector and arbiter of justice establish a dependence on the state for the 
women who seek help (Bumiller 96). This dependency is established through welfare, 
dependence on shelters, and social services. In essence, the state-sanctioned system of 
support has expanded patriarchy in both the public and private spheres. The expansion of 
male state power is accomplished through “creating the structural conditions in which 
women are dependent or require protection for both their material and psychological 
needs” (Bumiller 97). In other words, the state plays an integral role in creating a 
category of dependent women who are subject to its political power. This not only 
exacerbates female vulnerability, but also places them in a position of social 
disadvantage. In response to this expansion of state power and its invasion into the lives 
of women, Bumiller contrasts state support with the days of social support, when 
women’s shelters were run by organized groups of women and there was a larger network 
of female social support. In this manner, care was a response to individual female needs 
as opposed to a rigid state framework of victim support. While it is decidedly more social 
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than political in nature, it provides “opportunities for meaningful choice and autonomy 
[which] remain elusive for “victims”” (Bumiller 131). While Bumiller also explores 
political solutions and universalizing gender equality through legal means, such as 
CEDAW, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, she also 
acknowledges that a balance must be maintained between social support that does not 
exacerbate the victimization of women, and political solutions to inequality. 
 Ultimately, the state represents a problem of power. Women, who are deprived of 
social and political capital, are in a position of relative vulnerability when attempting to 
negotiate with the state to politically voice their suffering. The paradox of gender 
neutrality versus gender specificity may be impossible to resolve, but it may be possible 
to bypass the problem it presents. Wendy Brown articulates examining individual 
subjective identity and the importance of understanding the limits of law to capture the 
nuances of social life. While MacKinnon might simply respond by codifying legal 
solutions, Bumiller demonstrates that it is far more importance to balance between social 
solutions and political ones. As Wendy Brown articulates, state power is an intrusive 
force and codifying political solutions in many ways expands the power of the state. This 
sentiment is echoed by Kristin Bumiller, who suggests rethinking the effectiveness of the 
law in achieving universal gender equality by reframing the manner in which social 
support systems can be used to provide the support that the state fails to deliver. 
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V. Reconceptualizing Feminist Politics and the Defiance of State Power 
 
 When confronting state authority in order to re-imagine the effect of state power 
in the lives of women, it becomes necessary to question and defy the role of the state in 
the social sphere. A division between the personal and political limits the expansion of 
state authority, but also reframes the role of the state. When the state represents the 
absolute rule of law, individual autonomy is curtailed, establishing the state as an 
oppressive force. Judith Butler explores the process of defying state power in her political 
analysis of the play Antigone. In the play, Antigone is in direct confrontation with King 
Creon – who represents state power and patriarchal male authority – over the illegal 
burial of her brother, which invites an analysis of the spheres of social kinship and 
political rule. While Antigone has been traditionally viewed as an inherently political 
figure, Bonnie Honig, in an alternative analysis, views the play as an interpretation of 
sororal power and allegiance between women as a means to question male state power. 
These two analyses provide two means to imagine questioning male state power. While 
Butler’s Antigone represents political and social defiance, Honig’s Antigone is a story of 
sororal allegiance to create a new social and political order. Both analyses provide us 
with a means to question and re-frame state power and the role it plays in the lives of 
women. 
 The defiance of Antigone against King Creon over the burial of her brother 
questions not only traditional conceptions of power, but also social understandings of 
kinship. Antigone’s defiance is viewed as particularly subversive because she is outside 
the laws of both kinship and the state. By virtue of her incestuous family history, she 
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defies the laws of kinship and through her action as a political figure, transgresses the 
laws of the state. This brings her directly in conflict with King Creon, who represents 
state power, because the role of law is to limit subversive threats to its own power. 
Because Antigone is a woman, and the daughter of incest, she is seen as having no stake 
in state power because she is deprived of a place in the social and political order (Butler 
2000: 13). Therefore, Antigone operates outside the spheres of both kinship and politics. 
Her independence from these spheres allow her to challenge Creon’s rule and prompts 
the Chorus to characterize her actions as “manly” through mimicking supposedly “male” 
language and behavior (Butler 2000: 10). In this manner, Creon is “unmanned” by her, 
because he is challenged by an individual who falls outside the realm of the spheres of 
kinship and state power, which as the representation of state power, he is able to exert his 
authority. However, by saying no to the sovereign power, she removes herself from the 
community of these spheres, later leading to her death. Through this analysis, Butler is 
able to demonstrate the tension that arises through the defiance and questioning of state 
power. To defy state authority is to remove oneself from the community of the social and 
political spheres, but also to acknowledge the possibility of undermining the sphere of 
politics without entering into it. However, this defiance also challenges the role of the 
state as the final arbiter of justice. This implies that individual power and state power are 
two concepts that are in opposition to one another in that the expansion of one causes the 
reduction of the other. While Butler uncovers the deep tension that is created through 
questioning state authority, she also reveals this questioning as a possibility to reframe 
state power and its impact on the personal lives of the citizen. In this manner is it possible 
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for women to reclaim their own autonomy. By recognizing the pervasive aspects of state 
power, its authority is limited. 
 While Antigone may be traditionally framed as a story of political and social 
defiance, Bonnie Honig offers a different interpretation. Rather than framing Antigone as 
a political martyr, Honig describes her as acting in solidarity with her sister Ismene. By 
the two acting in concert, a sort of public is formed, despite Antigone never taking any 
steps to mobilize one (Honig 32). Generally speaking, Ismene is thought of as the 
apolitical character that highlights the exceptional nature of Antigone. However, Honig 
shows that Ismene is far more calm and calculating that her dramatic sister, making her a 
more effective political actor who is able to engage in a dialogue with King Creon (Honig 
34). Antigone, who is more of a defiant actor accepts death over submitting to his rule. 
However, despite Ismene’s calm demeanor, Honig illustrates evidence to support that she 
was the first to attempt to bury Polyneices. While Creon accuses Ismene of doing so, this 
is overshadowed by his rage over Antigone’s flagrant disobediance. Furthermore, Ismene 
openly states that she did it, while Antigone simply choses to refuse to deny her crime 
(Honig 43). This further highlights Antigone’s defiance because she not only refuses to 
admit to the crime, but also defies Creon’s power by refusing to accept the criminal 
nature of her act and submit herself to his power. However, despite the two different 
modes of political defiance, the two are essentially acting in tandem to subvert Creon’s 
authority. The two different approaches illustrate two possibilities for women. To act in 
an effective political manner while living under state power or to openly defy its 
authority and risk destruction in the process. The coalition between the two offers the 
possibility of alternative politics. Instead of Antigone’s political martyrdom, the unity 
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between Antigone and Ismene propose sororal communion as a site of agency and a 
means to reconsider patriarchal rule. Such an allegiance between women creates a new 
stage of political action. To embrace Antigone as a model for feminist politics is to be 
confronted with the tension between individual and state power and to invite the 
destruction of heroic martyrdom and defiance. In modern terms, this would mean to 
embrace social cooperation between women as a means to form a public in order to 
challenge patriarchal authority in much the same way Bumiller discusses a network of 
female social support. By changing the social framework in which individuals operate, 
the role of political power is transformed, in addition to how individuals negotiate with 
state power. 
 When women are interacting with the state, they are acting from a position from 
relative vulnerability because they are negotiating on the state’s terms. Because the state 
has the power to define and regulate individual identity and rights, its power over 
individuals is pervasive and defines the terms of political negotiation. Butler illustrates 
the conflict this creates through analyzing the political action of Antigone, who operates 
outside the spheres of political and social order to confront the authority of King Creon. 
However, political and social defiance is not the only option available to reframe state 
power. This option may even be ultimately destructive, as illustrated through the demise 
of Antigone in her political martyrdom. Honig’s interpretation of Antigone instead offers 
the option of creating a community of sororal cooperation. In this manner a public to 
question and challenge state power is formed and is able to be politically effective. Such 
an alliance would restructure social understandings of gender and feminist politics in 
order to rethink state power. This process of reconsidering state power allows for a 
100 
dialogue, much in the same way Ismene is capable of negotiating with King Creon, while 
Antigone is not. Ultimately, viewing Antigone’s defiance as a model for feminist politics 
exacerbates the conflict between female identity and state power. However, the 
cooperation between Ismene and Antigone hint at an alternative understanding to 
political action and a new form of feminist politics.  
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Afterword 
 
 Contemporary female questions struggle with imagining the construction of a 
gender equitable society and how one would functionally be achieved. Crucial to this 
understanding is the cause of female oppression and how it can be addressed through 
social and political means. Therefore, the presence of the state is central to understanding 
the issue at hand. Generally speaking, the state may be thought of as a simple and 
straightforward solution to addressing political and social vulnerability. However, as the 
chapters of this thesis indicate, the issue is far more complex. 
 Initially in the course of this thesis, I had assumed that I would be writing from a 
position of advocating state involvement. My early exposure to Catherine MacKinnon 
had made me far more sympathetic to the concrete legal responses she suggests. While to 
an extent, I still sympathize with her approach and tend to support her legal propositions, 
I realize that the legal changes she so adamantly defends are typically not as successful as 
one might hope. For example, Kristin Bumiller explores the extent to which legal 
protection and state services have protected women’s interests through examining the 
Central Park Jogger case along with statements from women who utilize state welfare. 
Rather than promote the interests of women, state power seems to establish itself as an 
intrusive force in the lives of women. In the case of achieving the vague ideal of 
“justice,” the state is established as the final arbiter of the law with the last say on official 
punishment and legal recourse. State power expands through vesting it with greater 
power to defend women. While the goal to protect women’s interests and provide paths 
of recourse for women is MacKinnon’s ultimate objective, gender inequality built on a 
complex relationship of social, political and historical values is not so easily subverted. 
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Furthermore, the state’s position of provider and protector invite the dependence of 
women, further stunting the quest for individual autonomy. Bumiller’s analysis of the 
welfare system as how it relates to women demonstrates that in many cases, women’s 
needs are not fully met, yet they become increasingly dependent upon state support. She 
points to past methods to distribute social support such as women’s centers that had 
previously been run by organized groups of women. This form of social support had been 
more equipped to deal with the issues confronted by women on an individual level. 
However, this return to the past is in opposition to MacKinnon’s legal push for what she 
would consider social and political progress. 
 While this conflict was surprising, it was not the only one I discovered. Feminist 
literature confronts a host of seemingly unsolvable paradoxes, such as the one proposed 
by Wendy Brown regarding encoding legal protection. As she so succinctly illustrates, 
while gender specific language in legal code does hold the possibility for the expanded 
protection of women, this is rarely the case. Furthermore, legal code that so specifically 
defines the vulnerability of women succeeds in confining women to this role by legally 
and politically entrenching social normative values. At the same time, gender neutrality, 
which, in its vagueness is able to uphold abstract universal ideals, leaves women without 
the protection of state power. Without this protection, the vulnerability of women is 
allowed to perpetuate, even if they are not being defined by that vulnerability in the same 
manner gender specificity would produce. This paradox being brought to light challenged 
what had previously been my unwavering support for Catherine MacKinnon’s legal 
arguments. However, while she does provide a succinct solution to gender inequality, her 
103 
solutions do not address the deeper, structural and theoretical issues associated with 
constructing a gender equitable state. 
 This theoretical conundrum ultimately left me caught up in the same conflict that 
has been the subject of debate within contemporary feminist literature. To unravel its 
complications, I began an analysis at what I view as the most individual level, the 
formation of personal gender identity and sexuality. The purpose of the chapter on 
sexuality and desire was to establish how the formation of an individual’s identity is 
defined by social and political contexts. What was discovered was that individual identity 
is not only formed through social and political contexts, but regulated through them as 
well. The social norms that govern individual expression are in turn reflected through the 
state regulation of individual behavior. Feminists and queer theorists point to the 
construction of gender norms that govern individual action. Furthermore, these norms 
function as an idealized mode of being. Norms are socially and politically established as 
an idealized expression of individual identity, and because they are pre-established as 
being ideal, demand conformity to them. That which is seen as deviant from the norm is 
seen as shameful, with greater shame imposed on greater deviations. This standard of 
normalcy is central to the complicated relationship between social values and the state. It 
introduced to me the problem of state power and how it directly impacts not only 
theoretical understandings, but also the lived experiences of individuals. However, it was 
important to note that this state regulation set the precedent of establishing the state as a 
tool for the legal regulation of social issues.  
In essence, this understanding established the state as the solution to issues such 
as sexual violence. It was important in analyzing the issue of sexual violence to consider 
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the social and political dimensions that dictate the lived experiences of women because 
ultimately, our theoretical understandings inform how we view sexual violence and what 
solutions are functionally viable. This brought me to the paradox between Wendy Brown 
and Catherine MacKinnon regarding encoding legal protection for women against gender 
inequality. The issue was further complicated by the advocacy of Katie Roiphe, whose 
surprisingly adamant assertions that women did not need – and in the case of women 
raped on college campuses, deserve – legal protection elicited a visceral personal 
response. But the issues proposed by these theoretical conflicts are important ones. The 
role of law and state power in addressing sexual violence in any context is both informed 
by and defines gender roles between men and women. Furthermore, it raised the issue of 
whether or not the state should be so deeply involved in the private lives of women. It 
was here that I formally diverted from my support of Catherine MacKinnon, as it should 
be noted that encoding legal protection does not perfectly address the needs or interests of 
women, nor does it protect women from state oppression. Seeking justice in the state 
should be done with caution, as it does not succeed in solving the issue of female 
oppression, but instead offers a number of possibilities for addressing gender inequality, 
each with its own complications. 
This process of encoding equality is a central issue of contemporary feminist 
debate. While previous chapters had established the question of state power and how it 
relates to gender equality, the concept of feminist jurisprudence begged the question of 
whether or not the state was responsible for the oppression of women and if state 
solutions could be found. For me, it seemed oddly paradoxical that one might seek 
protection and liberation from the same power that is seen as oppressive. This 
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complication revealed the dual nature of the state as both oppressor and protector and 
opened a set of theoretical and practical questions regarding addressing the vulnerability 
of women. I discovered that while the state holds the power to formulate the protection of 
women’s rights, it is also capable of perpetuating the relative state of vulnerability 
women experience.  
This penultimate conclusion is what established the need for a chapter addressing 
imagining alternatives to current understandings of gender identity, legal protection, and 
the role of the state in negotiating these concepts. In light of the paradoxes revealed by 
contemporary feminist literature, it became necessary to challenge not only current 
arguments regarding gender equality, but also the understandings these arguments were 
established upon. By reconsidering these roles, it was possible to reconsider possible 
solutions in order to respond to gender inequality in a productive manner. This 
exploration of alternatives compiled solutions proposed by theorists that dealt with 
calling for revising social norms in concert with revising the legal code. For example, 
challenging heteronormative values established an alternative framework, which allowed 
for the re-imagining of social roles. This fundamentally changed how political responses 
were considered. While the paradox between gender-specificity and gender-neutrality 
was unresolved, re-imagining social values held the possibility of bypassing the issue 
altogether. For example, Kristin Bumiller suggests that while the state is an intrusive 
force, this intrusion can be counteracted by reframing how social support systems can be 
used to provide the support that the state is unable to. Bonnie Honig echoes this statement 
by suggesting an alternative feminist politics of sororal cooperation. In essence, she 
advocates forming a public that questions and challenges state power and social 
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understandings of gender roles. This reconsideration of state power opens up a dialogue 
to negotiate with the state without compromising female interests. 
While the solutions I found were not as satisfying as Catherine MacKinnon’s 
charged assertions, I feel they are far more reasonable in that they address the social and 
political complexities of gender equality. While it might be more straightforward to 
combat gender equality by attempting to legally encode these aspects, women’s interests 
would not be effectively served. Instead, it is necessary to re-imagine the larger system 
within which we operate. Reconsidering identity, social roles, and political power 
confronts the issue of gender inequality on multiple levels and holds the possibility of a 
new sociopolitical order. However, the manner in which this functionally could be 
brought about remains elusive. Yet despite the elusive nature of gender inequality, 
contemporary literature shows the progress made within the past decade alone and holds 
promise for re-imagining the social and political definitions of male-female relationships. 
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